Able Danger and the Cole
These Able Danger people were good. So not only did the 9/11 Commission leave out that Able Danger identified Atta, the Commission’s section on the Cole is very sketchy as well and doesnt include that Able Danger issued a warning about Aden three weeks before the Cole bombing. The 9/11 report also doesnt include the information that Yemeni governmental travel documents for the Cole bombers were admitted as evidence into Yemeni court during trial. ( I have to find that link on the court documents, its here on the blog somewhere.) And what was it Hassani said, oh yes, upper level Yemeni officials were complicit in the bombing. And oddly enough, the latest hit and run victims in Yemen are Hassanis underlings (2).
NYP: Members of a secret Pentagon intelligence unit known as Able Danger warned top military generals that it had uncovered information of increased al Qaeda “activity” in Aden harbor less than three weeks before the attack on the USS Cole, The Post has learned.In the latest explosive revelation in the Able Danger saga, two former members of the data-mining team are expected to testify to the Senate Judiciary Committee next week that they uncovered alarming terrorist activity and associations in Aden weeks before the Oct. 12, 2000, suicide bombing of the U.S. warship that killed 17 sailors.
Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s former liaison to Able Danger, told The Post that Capt. Scott Phillpott, Able Danger’s leader, briefed Gen. Peter Schoomaker, former head of Special Operations Command and now Army chief of staff, about the findings on Yemen “two or three weeks” before the Cole attack.
“Yemen was elevated by Able Danger to be one of the top three hot spots for al Qaeda in the entire world,” Shaffer recalled.
Shaffer and two other officials familiar with Able Danger said contractors uncovered al Qaeda activities in Yemen through a search of Osama bin Laden’s business ties.
The Pentagon had no immediate comment.
So there was a report of a lot of terrorist activity issued in three weeks before. Zinni , who was the ultimate decision maker was unaware of the warning, and made the decision about 12 days prior to the bombing to send the Cole to Aden. Apparently he had a lot of confidence in the sincerity of the Yemeni government’s commitment to fighting terror.
SEN. LEVIN: And who was responsible for force protection?GEN. ZINNI: The force protection in the port is the responsibility of the Yemeni government…
According to the 9/11 report, the Cole bombers had no prior knowledge of the arrival of the Cole, Hassani disputes that. Zinni doesn’t seem to even contemplate it.
I want to say, in every visit, I was seen by the president. As a matter of fact, when the president came to Washington, he asked me to come to Washington to visit him. His interest in our military-to-military relations, his interest in our helping him develop this capability of counterterrorism was direct and personal.
Lovely guy that Saleh.
Could you tell us — excuse me — who is responsible once the decision has been made to commence refueling stops or port visits in a particular country for making these specific arrangements for the visit in terms of fuel, pilots, services and the like?GEN. ZINNI: First of all, it is done under the conditions of the contract that is set. It is done with — it includes our embassy working with us. I think in this case you’ve probably seen that the military attache was down there coordinating this, was actually aboard ship, I believe, when the incident occurred. It is done with the port authority, and the government of Yemeni officials; their security forces.
YT 2000: (Saleh) added that Americans made a mistake when they entered the port with such a large size and greatly valuable destroyer without guarding or notifying the Yemeni side to provide such protection.
YT 2003 The US newspaper reported that al-Hitar said “the government had not investigated the allegations against Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani to confirm whether he did issue such a religious order, or fatwa, targeting the warship Cole,” adding, “People suspected in the Cole case have said they acted according to a fatwa by Sheik Abdul Majeed.”
YT 2001: Yemeni observers consider the actions of Abyan Army as a message directed to the Yemeni government falsifying the continuous statements of the Ministry of Interior that this group is no longer active and that its entity as an Army is no longer valid as most of its members are either imprisoned or executed. It is worth mentioning that the (Abyan) army also tried many times to request the government to stop arresting their members and affiliates and instead offer them positions in the Yemeni army.
AN 2002: The London- based al-Sharq al-Awsat said yesterday it had received a statement through Ansar al-Sharia (al-Sharia partisans) in London in which Aden – Abyan army claims responsibility for blowing off the French oil tanker in Dubba port at the coast of Hadramout in Yemen.
(I wonder if the Yemeni goverment has shut down those 143 terrorist affiliated bank accounts yet?)
