Armies of Liberation

Update: Strategy Page has addressed the issue of appeasment previously. Theres quite an assortment of articles here in the archives. W/A

A response to James Dunnigan writing at Strategy Page: “Why Moslem Countries Cooperate Against al Qaeda”

James Dunnigan, a quite astute, well respected, leading analysist recently assessed the Yemeni regime as authentically cooperating in the WOT as evidenced by the recent capture of Mubkhit Salih al Kuabi, a top al-Qaeda operative working for Zarchawi who was planning attacks on US interests. Also Mr. Dunnigan rightly points out that criminal enterprises are a regional problem and a function of lax law enforcement. Mr. Dunnigan writes:

Yemen, despite having an ongoing civil war with Islamic conservative Shia tribes on the Saudi border, plus many Sunni Arab Yemenis being big fans of al Qaeda, has made progress crippling terrorist operations in their territory. The recent arrest of al Qaedas senior man in Yemen, Mubkhit Salih al Kuabi was a major operation. More attacks on American ships were planned by al Qaeda, and al Kuabi was sent to make it happen. Apparently, the intelligence efforts of several Arab countries, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, were used to identify and locate al Kuabi (who was working for Iraqi al Qaeda leader al-Zarqawi.)

Al Kuabi turned out to be a very senior guy, very well connected, and very useful once interrogators got to work on him. Yemen plays down this cooperation with other Arab countries, mainly because the Sunni Arab leaders of those nations fear the popular appeal of al Qaeda and their suicide bomber “martyrs.”

Sunni Arabs don’t like the idea of democracy in Iraq, and would really like the Sunni Arab minority there to be back in power. Al Qaeda wants that as well, but they want a Sunni Arab religious leader running the show. Al Qaeda also wants to take all the current Arab leaders and behead them. This is part of al Qaeda’s appeal to the average Arab. This is also the reason for the energetic efforts by Arab governments to wipe out al Qaeda.

Bahrain, however, publicly admitted that they had signed a deal with Yemen to share information on terrorism, and organized crime. That’s another problem in the area. Criminal gangs have long benefited by lax law enforcement in the region, especially if the gang boss developed friends in government, and was a big tipper. Controlling organized crime is right up there with suppressing Islamic terrorism, for Gulf Arab governments.

But it’s not just Arab leaders who have serious problems with terrorists and gangsters.

My response: The main characteristic of Yemeni President Saleh is he is an appeaser. He accommodates the tribes, al-Qaeda, President Bush, the criminal gangsters, and neighboring countries in a juggling act that’s been going on for decades. One of Saleh’s unique talents is his ability to manipulate information in ongoing propaganda campaigns tailored to placate each of his major constituents.

The fact that foreign intelligence located and identified al-Kuaibi required Saleh to respond in an overtly cooperative manner. But that cannot be taken as a mark of his sincerity or commitment to fighting al-Qaeda. The regime in many ways is systematically cooperative with al-Qaeda and enables their stability rather then disrupts it.

In the State Department’s report Patterns of Terrorism (2003), State notes that 10 of the Cole bombers escaped, a not infrequent occurrence. They remain at large except for two reportedly killed in suicide bombings in Iraq. Additionally, the re-education provided by Judge Hittar has been repudiated by one of its graduates, bin Laden’s driver, as a mechanism of expediting the release of al-Qaeda. He indicated the understanding with the regime is attacks are not permitted in Yemen, but outside is acceptable. State’s problem with Hittar’s program was that the US was unable to interrogate several detainees prior to their release. Jailed al-Qaeda often receive preferential treatment while incarcerated, including leading prayer services. A third issue noted by State was the deliberate effort to mislead the US by reporting a major terrorist as killed in a raid by security forces, although he is alive and has not since been recaptured. Thus the regime is physically shielding the terrorists from the international community, a practice that continues to date.

The regime also shields their finances, and 143 of 144 terrorist affiliated bank accounts in Yemen have not been frozen as required by the UN. The UN circular identifying those accounts was not circulated to Yemeni banks in 2004. No action has been taken to restrict the activities of UN identified “Major Terrorist” Sheik al-Zindani. Similarly, major al-Qaeda facilitator General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar is given a free rein by his half bother, President Saleh, to pursue his activities. A flood of terrorists have streamed into Iraq who have graduated Yemeni training camps, carry Yemeni documents, and are funded by Yemeni well wishers. Of over 20 Yemeni suicide bombers, two were Cole escapees. And some Yemeni terrorists are reported killed numerous times.

Furthermore it is uncontestable that the regime is pushing extremist ideology through society, in the mosques and schools, quickly excommunicating anyone who objects. Afghan Arab preachers are trucked into the mosques, schools closed include moderate Zaidi and Shaifi, not extremist institutions. Students from al-Iman university were tasked to teach at governmental summer school.

The criminal activity certainly is a product of lax law enforcement on the part of Saleh. But when illegal weapon transfers are repeatedly made by Yemeni Air Force transports, to give Saleh a total pass on criminal activity is very generous. When Saleh is profiting from the diesel smuggling along with his friend Tawfeeq Abdulraheem , and the drug smuggling is facilitated by his close family member, there must come a point of responsibility. When governmental institutions regularly disburse counterfeit money, it indicates more than a passive association with criminal enterprises. Corruption and criminal enterprises are deeply entrenched in the Yemeni economy to the detriment of any future prospects for the nation and provide quite of bit of terrorist financing.

So while it is fair to say that Yemen has a problem with terrorists and gangsters, the fact remains that many of the main supporters of terrorists and partners of gangsters are members of the regime and the inner circle of President Saleh, who continues to profit and facilitate their activities. We cannot say the recent capture of a top al-Qaeda operative is an indication of authentic cooperation, but may be another of Saleh’s appeasements designed to placate the international community and maintain the facade of partnership. Similarly, intelligence sharing with Bahrain may only go as far as necessary to maintain the impression of cooperation. The model of “rehabilitate and engage cooperatively” that is successful in Pakistan seems to have failed in Yemen, as President Saleh is neither rehabilitated nor cooperative.