COUNTRY BRIEFING
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
The likely result of Yemen’s presidential election, for which campaigning gets underway on August 23rd, will be a resounding vote in favour of a fresh term for the incumbent, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has dominated the country’s political scene since becoming president of pre-unification North Yemen in 1978. However, this reaffirmation of support for a veteran autocrat–an all too familiar occurrence in the Middle East and North Africa–has been far from straightforward, as Mr Saleh has spent much of the past year insisting that he would not stand in the election, which is scheduled to take place on September 20th.
Mr Saleh finally relented at a huge political convention organised by his party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), on June 24th. “Yielding to the people’s desire, I will run in the coming polls,” he proclaimed. The rally had been called for the ruling party to select its candidate for the poll after Mr Saleh had publicly reiterated, just two days earlier, that he was standing down. However, in response to what he called the “chants, statements, messages, poems and calls by the scholars, intellectuals, civil society and political parties”, Mr Saleh chose his moment to the greatest dramatic effect.
Form
The announcement came as little surprise, given Mr Saleh’s past form; the events leading-up to his eventual change of mind have followed almost exactly the same course as in the run-up to the previous presidential election in 1999. It is unclear what Mr Saleh had hoped to gain from his political manoeuvre. Although he may have been aiming to rally support around him, by forcing a public debate about how the country would fare in his absence, his “change of heart” also exposed him to a degree of personal criticism in the domestic and international media that is almost unprecedented.
It appears, however, that Mr Saleh’s ploy may in part have been to demonstrate to the West, and the US in particular, that he is irreplaceable and that, accordingly, the US administration should not push too hard for reform. Yemen’s polity is built on a network of alliances and allegiances that Mr Saleh has painstakingly put together over his years in the presidential palace. These myriad ties are far more powerful than the institutions of state, which are consequently probably too weak to withstand a transfer of power. Mr Saleh’s political passing therefore would undoubtedly result in increased instability in the country, as various previously subdued socio-political forces would then come to the fore and vie for power. With Yemen viewed by the US administration as a crucial partner in its “war on terror”, a breakdown in law and order in the country is not a prospect likely to be welcomed in Washington.
After Mr Saleh let it be know last year that he wished to step aside, many local and international commentators and politicians had hailed the decision as the moment that Yemen’s democratic experiment came of age, an experiment that would show the rest of the Arab world in particular that Yemen was at the forefront of bringing pluralism to the region. It would also have ended the belief that Arab republics are simply family dynasties in disguise. Such hopes were always fanciful, but those who had greeted his decision with optimism will no doubt feel let down by his later volte-face. Not only does this reflect badly on him, but it also serves as a reminder that Yemen’s official democratic pretensions are far removed from the reality.
The rival
In early July, shortly after Mr Saleh’s announcement, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) parliamentary coalition, which includes the two main opposition parties, Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), nominated their own candidate for the poll, Faisal bin Shamlan. In itself, this was a significant development, since at the last presidential election Islah did not select its own candidate, instead announcing, even before the ruling party nominated him, that Mr Saleh could represent them.
The decision this time round to field a candidate against Mr Saleh can be seen in light of the growing rift between Islah and the GPC, or, more accurately, between Islah’s head, Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, and Mr Saleh. Sheikh Ahmar, who derives much of his power from being the paramount sheikh of the Hashid tribal confederation (Yemen’s biggest tribal grouping), has long been an important force, and his support has at times propped up Mr Saleh’s regime. Although there are no clear reasons for the growing differences between the two, it is possible that the increasing influence of Sheikh Ahmar’s sons, in particular Hamid, a member of parliament, is behind the rift. Hamid has publicly called for Mr Saleh’s regime to be overthrown and many now believe that he sees himself as a future contender for the presidency. If so, this might well pit him against Mr Saleh’s own son, Ahmed, who many suspect is being groomed to take over from his father. The rift between these two powerful families could be significant and could potentially destabilise Mr Saleh’s third term, assuming that he does win the election, as the younger generation fights it out to succeed him.
