II. Major Changes in Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya’s Ideology
*Shari’a and the Law
One of the most difficult hurdles for Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya in the conciliation initiative was their previous demand for the establishment of a shari’a state in which shari’a would be the law of the land - a demand from which they had to back down.
Each Arab country defines differently the relationship between Islamic and civil law. In Yemen, for instance, shari’a is “the source of all legislation,” and in most of the Gulf states, it is “the main source of legislation.” Shari’a is not mentioned at all in the constitutions of other countries, such as Tunisia. In Egypt, Section 2 of the constitution sets out a loose affiliation between shari’a and the law, stating that the “principles” of the Islamic shari’a are “the main source of legislation.” The connection becomes looser still because of Section 1 of the constitution, which states that Egypt is “a state whose regime is socialist, democratic, and based on a coalition of the workers among the people.”
Previously, Al-Gama’a’s demand for a shari’a state was uncompromising, as can be learned from an early 1990s statement by Safwat ‘Abd Al-Ghani, an Al-Gama’a military wing leader: “I am a Muslim who has sworn to wage jihad for the sake of Allah until it achieves one of two good things - victory or martyrdom. The meaning of victory, simply put, is the restoration of the Islamic Khilafa [Caliphate] in the lands from which is it was removed, the liquidation of all secular infidel regimes, the application of Allah’s law, and the building of an Islamic society… My brothers and I are in a state of war with rulers who do not implement the law of Allah. This is a war that was forced upon us, whether we want it or not.” [22]
Ultimately, the Al-Gama’a’s leaders found a creative solution to the problem of giving up their previous demand for a shari’a state and to the halt to the struggle to achieve it. Their new argument was that “even if the ruler does not apply a law or laws from the Islamic shari’a, he is not considered an infidel as long as he does not hold a position that his [man-made] rulings are better than the rulings of Allah.” [23] Thus, according to the new approach, there are extenuating circumstances for tolerating a ruler even if he refrains from applying shari’a law.
*The Rule of God, Managed by Man
Following this shift in the approach to the application of shari’a law, the Al-Gama’a leaders disassociated themselves from some fundamental concepts to which they had clung throughout the years of struggle. One such concept was the “rule of God,” HakimiyyatAllah. Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya Shura Council head Karam Zuhdi explained that there was a difference between the rule of God expressed in shari’a and the rule of man expressed in detailed legislation and the day-to-day matters of running the state: “It is true that there is no rule besides the rule of Allah. But people need an Emir and a ruler to run their affairs in a way that does not contravene the fundamental principles of Islamic law. The shari’a brought down by Allah is the supreme rule, but religious law that actually implements shari’a must be a humane, religious, and self-renewing law that adapts to innovations of time and place, to interests, and to reality, the norms, and all human changes. Divine rule, whose foundations are the basic principles, exists; it does not concern itself with details. In contrast, the rule of man is what concerns itself… with sundry and changing matters. People are entitled to set laws that suit them for their generation, and such laws are binding to all as long as they do not contravene the rulings of the shari’a.
“Islamic rule is ultimately civil rule whose ruler must meet conditions: qualifications, capability, and justice. Another condition is that the ruler is elected by an ancient mechanism that was in the past called a ‘vow of allegiance’ attesting to all the people’s acceptance of his authority; he can be criticized and punished, even deposed. He must strictly observe the law, but because he is human, he may make mistakes. The connection between him and the nation is determined in a contract with rules and conditions. Opposition is the deeply rooted right of any man in society.” [24]
Asked about the difference between this regime model and Western democracy, Zuhdi answered: “We have no reason to be leery of labels. If you want to call it democracy or shura - so be it. We do not need to oppose something just because of its name, or because it came to us from the West. Wisdom is like the believer’s lost animal - wherever it is found, he has first right to it. However, the religious and moral aspect of these rights in Islam makes them sacred and binding, [to an extent] nonexistent in Western democracy.” [25]
*Islamic Punishment and the Law
One prominent manifestation of non-implementation of shari’a law concerns the punishments dictated by Islamic law - al-hudud al-shar’iyya. “These laws were legislated by Allah, and they will continue to exist until Judgment Day,” explained Hamdi ‘Abd Al-Rahman, “We cannot expunge the verses setting out the punishment for the adulterer or the punishment for the thief from the Koran. But if the government refrains from implementing these verses for specific reasons - for example, because we are not alone in the world, because other forces are lying in wait for us, or because of fear of domestic civil war among the Muslims and Christians - in this case, we accept that this [non-implementation] is justified… Such a ruler can in no way be declared an infidel.” [26]
In the same interview, ‘Abd Al-Rahman stated that the ruler has a right to limit the number of pilgrims to Mecca so as to prevent a foreign-currency drain from economically distressed Egypt.
In effect, Al-Gama’a’s leaders accepted an unofficial status quo: In exchange for its relinquishing the goal of a shari’a state, the Egyptian regime would continue to maintain a minimal Islamic image and refrain from public demonstrations of secularism. As Hamdi ‘Abd Al-Rahman put it: “A ruler who is incapable of implementing the Islamic shari’a due to international, economic, or domestic circumstances is justified in doing so. At the same time, he cannot destroy or mock shari’a. He must not say, for example, that amputating a thief’s hand is backwardness, or that stoning an adulterer or adulteress is barbarism.” [27]
*Adapting Religious Law to Reality
Al-Gama’a leaders described the organization’s turnaround on shari’a implementation as a transition from attempting to adapt reality to the sacred text to attempting to adapt the sacred text to reality. “Religious rulings are not alienated from reality,” explained Nageh Ibrahim, Accused No. 4 in the Great Jihad Case of 1981. “You must read reality and read the text and then apply the proper text to the proper reality. It would be a mistake to apply the right text to a reality that is not the reality to which it should be applied.” [28]
Muhammad Shu’eib, who was released after 13 years’ imprisonment and whose sisters are married to Karam Zuhdi and Sheikh Omar Abd Al-Rahman, [29] demonstrated the rethinking of the relationship between shari’a and reality by saying, “The thief’s punishment was not revealed [i.e. was not designated] for a poor or hungry society - otherwise the hands of half the people in the society would be amputated. These punishments were revealed as a model for an [ideal] Islamic society in which all the laws of Islam are applied, such as collecting charity and commitment to social welfare. In this case, the Islamic punishments [and the other laws] complement one another. But if all these things are not provided, applying the punishments is injustice.” [30]
It was important to the leaders to emphasize that, in the words of Osama Hafez, Accused No. 10 in the Great Jihad Case of 1981, “the defect does not lie in the text.” Hafez explained, “Ibn Taymiyya [the 13th century Islamic scholar considered by Islamist organizations today to be their religious authority] issued fatwas regarding the Mongols, because in his time the Mongols invaded the Islamic state. This required him to mobilize the people against the Mongols, and therefore his fatwas showed rigidity and encouraged [the Muslims] towards confrontation. If we were to implement these fatwas today, in a different reality, it would be out of place.
“Another example is Kamal Ataturk, who tried to change the identity of Turkey and required the people to take off their turbans and put on [Western-style] hats. Although religiously speaking, wearing a hat was not something that could be seen in terms of prohibited or permitted, the clerics of that generation saw Ataturk’s acts as dissociation from the Islamic identity, and therefore issued fatwas stating that wearing a hat was heresy. Must we apply these fatwas today, when reality has changed utterly?” [31]
* Shari’a and International Reality
Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya’s leaders maintained that the international situation must be considered when issuing fatwas. Karam Zuhdi, who authored the book Renewing Shari’a Law in a Changing World - A Modern Look at the Issue of Rule, explained that in the current international situation, it was better to maintain what already existed than to persist with the goal of an Islamic state: “Some of the Islamic factions made a serious mistake by not attributing sufficient importance to the world changes that led to the collapse of the world order based on two international poles struggling for influence in the Cold World era. The intensive military presence of the only pole [i.e. the U.S.] in the region following Saddam’s failed invasion of Kuwait; the aspiration to transform Israel into the region’s leader; the recurring statements by the American religious conservative right that allied itself with Zionism, [i.e.] that Islam is the rival that supplanted the Soviet rival; the de facto entrance into the phase of the clash of civilizations - all these changes obliged us to reexamine our past efforts.
“We discovered that it was essential for us to reexamine our relations with the regimes [in the Arab world], which are subjected to heavy pressures by the forces of global hegemony. We discovered also that we must help rehabilitate society in a way that will preserve its unity in the face of the new challenges, because the danger looms even over what exists of religion and the shari’a. Furthermore, national independence itself is under threat from without…” [32]
*Precedents in Refraining from Applying the Shari’a
To demonstrate the religious correctness of their new stance, the Al-Gama’a leaders cited several examples from Islamic history to try to prove that the founders of Islam had also been ready, in cases of extenuating circumstances, to refrain from applying the shari’a.
Muhammad Shu’eib adduced the example of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, the second Caliph, who did not amputate thieves’ hands during the “gray year” - the year 17 of the Hijra, or 638 C.E. - because it was a year of extremely severe drought: “The economic conditions at that time did not allow the meting out of this punishment… Similarly, it is not logical that I would demand in this era, when there is a marriage crisis, to apply the punishment for adultery. The young people who commit adultery today are not the same as the young people who committed adultery in the days of the Prophet or of his companions, because the young person of our time must deal with many temptations.” [33]
Hamdi ‘Abd Al-Rahman cited the example of the Christian King Al-Najashi of Abyssinia, whoconverted to Islam but refrained from applying Islamic law; nevertheless, when he died the Prophet told his companions: “Pray for your brother.” [34]
*Resistance in Islamist Circles to Concessions on Implementing Shari’a
Kamal Habib, formerly a leader of the Jihad organization who also jumped on the reform bandwagon, said, “The Islamic state ruled by shari’a remains my own personal demand, and that of every Muslim,” but added that an attempt could be made to realize it in non-violent ways. Adapting Von Clausewitz, Habib said: “If war is the continuation of politics by other means, then politics is the continuation of war by other means. The Islamists can wage a political and social struggle without employing armed conflict that damages their credibility in society.” [35]
Unlike Habib, the Al-Gama’a leaders were not saying that shari’a law remained their “personal demand” nor that it could be realized through peaceful means. They were saying that not applying shari’a was reasonable, tolerable, and forgivable. Thus it is no wonder that they drew fire from various Islamic thinkers. Sheikh Abu Hamza Al-Masri, who resides in London and identifies ideologically with Al-Qaeda, called Karam Zuhdi “a bearded tyrant who permits the ruler to rule not according to Allah’s religious law and forgives him for it.” [36]
In answer, Muhammad Shu’eib accused “clerics in their upholstered armchairs in London… who wage jihad by means of faxes and newspapers” of inciting against the rulers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia where the laws were compatible to some degree with shari’a, while treating with respect the rulers of London and Berlin, where the laws of their land had nothing whatsoever to do with the Islamic shari’a. [37]
But criticism on this matter emanated also from Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya thinkers as well. Osama Rushdie, who, even though he had quit the Al-Gama’a leadership was still identified with the organization, wrote that some had asked him what was the point of the organization’s existence if it forgave a ruler for refraining from applying the shari’a: “The truth is that I found no answer to this question, and I think that the best thing anyone who wants to continue this series of tedious statements can do is to complete the move by declaring the Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya disbanded, since the dead must be honored with burial.” [38]
III. Jihad
*Jihad and the Islamic Interest
In all matters of jihad, pragmatic considerations dominate the new arguments by Al-Gama’a leaders. “The mistake was that in the past, the text was preferred over the religious interest,” explained Hamdi ‘Abd Al-Rahman: “We waged jihad without taking into account the gains and losses that could result. Now the concepts have changed, and it is the interest that is preferred over the text. If the text calls for jihad against the Jews, I must, first of all, even before jihad, consider the interest: Will my interest be realized by waging jihad or by not waging jihad?” [39]
The leaders gave many examples of cases of deciding between an ill-considered jihad and Islamic interests. Nageh Ibrahim recounted that a few months prior to the May 2003 Casablanca bombing, Moroccan political forces had rejected an anti-terror bill that would have granted the security apparatuses extensive powers. Following the bombing, the bill passed unanimously. “This is how the perpetrators of the bombings put the noose around the necks of all the Islamic movement in Morocco.” [40]
*Defining Jihad
According to the new ideology, jihad is a means used only against the external enemies of Islam. To face its internal challenge, the Islamic movement uses preaching and the call to Islam - da’wa - as well as hisbah, or the enforcement of the Islamic moral and legal code of behavior. [41]
According to ‘Ali Al-Sharif, Accused No. 6 in the Sadat assassination case, “one of the most common mistakes that occurred was a mistaken interpretation of jihad. Jihad is a commandment, but it is permitted by religious law [only] to eradicate civil strife [among Muslims], and to eradicate polytheism from the face of the earth. By virtue of jihad, the Islamic state was transformed from a small village to the greatest country in the world. But in our day, jihad has become an injustice… In our day, many young Muslims have risen up against their Muslim country and institutions, on the pretext that this is jihad. As a result, young Muslims have reaped enormous catastrophes, and the nation has been weakened. The young people fought for the sake of da’wa, and da’wa was prevented; they fought for the sake of a minority detained in the prisons, and the number of detainees grew… They should have realized that as long as the outcome of the fighting was bad, this fighting could not be called religiously correct. It is [a kind of] fighting that is forbidden by the religion.” [42]
Al-Gama’a leaders often referred to the struggle against Israel as a factor that united the Islamic movement and the regime. In their book on the conciliation initiative, Osama Hafez and ‘Issam ‘Abd Al-Maged explained at length how Israel, along with the U.S., the West, and “the secularists,” profit from the continued violence between the Islamic movements and the Egyptian regime. Moreover, although Al-Gama’a has always been ideologically opposed to suicide attacks, Hamdi ‘Abd Al-Rahman claimed that in Israel’s case, “it is permissible to kill the occupiers using any form of combat, including martyrdom [i.e. suicide] operations, primarily since the Israelis attack innocent Palestinian civilians, women and children.” [43]
At any rate, the leaders of the organization are not displeased with Egypt’s relations with its “external enemy,” Israel. As Badri Makhluf, an Al-Gama’a military wing leader, said: “No one can deny that Egypt has taken an active stand in relation to Palestine… Egypt has fought wars for the sake of Palestine, and is now willing to sacrifice anything so that there will be no concessions on the Palestine issue. Egypt is the center of gravity of the [Palestinian] issue, and this was one of the reasons for our rethinking… Otherwise, how will we deal with the Jews? We want to close ranks against this [Jewish] state planted in our midst. Egypt, including all of its ethnic groups, must stand up for the sake of liberating Jerusalem and for establishing the Palestinian state.” [44]
*Ban on Rebellion Against the Regime
The Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya leaders’ decision that the Egyptian regime was not apostate eliminated the need to oppose it, topple it, or replace it with an Islamic regime. But the leaders went even further and added a host of pragmatic and historical arguments aimed at proving that the damage caused by rebellion against even a heretical ruler may outweigh its usefulness, in which case it would not be a proper course of action.
According to Hamdi ‘Abd Al-Rahman, “rebellion against the ruler has in every generation caused great damage to the Islamic nation, not only in the case of Sadat, but also before.” He said that although Al-Hussein Ibn ‘Ali had justice on his side when he rebelled against Yazid Ibn Mu’awiyya, the damage was great. The only instance in which rebellion is permitted against a ruler is when he shows “clear and present heresy.” But even then, “this must not be done before examining the profit and loss of rebellion, and if the damages are the greater, there must be no rebellion against the ruler.” [45]
IV. Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Society
*Ban on Takfir (Declaring a Muslim Individual to be Apostate)
The ideological turnaround in the Al-Gama’a leadership greatly affected relations between the organization and Egyptian society. Militant Islamic organizations in Egypt had always employed various levels of takfir - i.e. accusing society, or individuals within society, of heresy. The most extreme organization, Gama’at Al-Muslimoun, known in the media as Gama’at Al-Takfir w’Al-Hijra, which had been active primarily in the 1970s, stated that all of Egyptian society was heretical [jahili] and that true Muslims must separate themselves from it.
According to Al-Gama’a’s leaders, the organization’s ideology has always forbidden takfir. As Nageh Ibrahim explained, “I say to every Muslim brother: The fact that you have become a member of a Muslim group does not mean you have the right to declare someone apostate. The decision about who is apostate and who is not lies in the hands of the clerics… we accuse no one of heresy… we are not accusing all the Muslims… not the police, not the army, not the country’s security apparatus, not the internal security apparatus, and not the government institutions… We are not accusing any civil servant [of heresy] merely because he is a civil servant - a post that has never been proof of the heresy of the individual holding it.” [46]
Nevertheless, on at least one occasion Al-Gama’a has employed takfir: It was Sheikh Omar ‘Abd Al-Rahman who issued the fatwa branding Sadat an apostate. Hamdi ‘Abd Al-Rahman said that this fatwa was issued before Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya had consolidated its ideology. [47] However, at least at the level of operatives in the field, Al-Gama’a members had more extreme ideas regarding society’s heresy. Sabri Al-Khater, one of two brothers who turned themselves in after five years as fugitives, said that the man who had recruited them into Al-Gama’a, a man by the name of Sheikh ‘Imad, had taught them that according to the organization’s principles, “we must confront the entire society, because it goes along with what Sheikh ‘Imad sees as incompatible with the shari’a of Allah.” [48]
*Ban on the Killing of Civilians
Egyptian society’s partial acceptance and recognition of Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya and other Islamic groups was severely damaged by civilian deaths in attacks. The issue of the religious c
