US Congressman Russ Feingold Mentions Yemen
Dated 8/6/09, LOC
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President…. At the same time, we must focus more attention beyond the safe havens and instability in South Asia, particularly on Yemen and Somalia. The threat from al-Qaida affiliates in those countries, as well as from al Shebaab, is increasing. Weak states, chronic instability, vast ungoverned areas, and unresolved local tensions have created almost ideal safe havens in which terrorists can recruit and operate. They have also attracted foreign fighters including, in the case of Somalia, Americans. Al-Qaida’s long tentacles reach into these countries, and our efforts to track individual operatives are critical, just as they are in Pakistan. But, while we should aggressively pursue al-Qaida leaders, we will not achieve our long-term strategic goals if we think about coun ter ter ror ism primarily as a manhunt or if we assume there is a finite number of terrorists in the world. Conditions in places such as Yemen and Somalia create and attract new ones. That is why press stories suggesting that operatives from Pakistan are relocating, while troubling, ignore the larger strategic picture. Because of conditions on the ground, al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen and Somalia are perfectly capable of expanding their reach and capabilities on their own. And the best way to stop them is to address head-on the reasons–frequently unique to the countries in which they are operating–for their success.
The threats to our national security in Yemen are serious and are getting worse. News last month about the murder of as many as nine hostages in Yemen, which Yemeni officials have linked to groups affiliated with al-Qaida, is a reminder of the increasing violence there. As in Peshawar, our diplomats have been in the crosshairs, with the attack last September on our Embassy in Sana’a. And, as our State Department has warned, al-Qaida in Yemen’s recruitment remains strong, and its tactics indicate high levels of training, coordination, and sophistication. Any serious effort against al-Qaida in Yemen will require the engagement of the government, whose capabilities and commitment are extremely weak. Yemen is a fragile state whose government has limited control outside the capital. It is also distracted from the coun ter ter ror ism effort by two other sources of domestic instability–the al-Houthi rebellion in the north and tensions with a southern region with which Sana’a was united less than 20 years ago. In other words, coun ter ter ror ism is hampered by weak governance and by internal conflicts that would not appear on the surface to threaten our interests. Our only choice, then, is to develop a comprehensive policy toward Yemen that places coun ter ter ror ism within a broader framework that promotes internal stability, economic development, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.
And we must do this while considering the obstacles to repatriating the approximately 100 Yemeni detainees currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. I have spoken out about security gaps in Yemen, particularly with regard to the escape from detention of a terrorist operative responsible for the attack on the USS Cole. I support the closing of Guantanamo, but with so many of its detainees hailing from Yemen, we need to take an honest look at the weaknesses in Sana’a’s justice and security systems and consider whether there is anything we can do about them.
Instability in Yemen is, of course, directly linked to conflict in the Horn of Africa. Earlier this year, the pirate attack on a U.S. vessel briefly raised awareness of maritime insecurity fostered by a lack of effective governance and insufficient naval capacity on both sides of the Gulf of Aden. This problem continues, even when it is not on the front pages, and is both a symptom and a driver of overall instability in the region. Meanwhile, refugees from the conflict in Somalia are fleeing to Yemen. According to a recent U.N. report, thirty 30,000 have crossed the Gulf of Aden this year with thousands more preparing to do so. The human cost to this exodus, as well as the potentially destabilizing affects, demand our attention. Finally, Yemen is linked to the Horn of Africa through arms trafficking that violates the U.N. embargo on Somalia and fuels the conflict there.
The threat in northern Somalia is, or should be, more apparent now than ever. Last October, terrorists attacked in Somaliland and Puntland. These are regions–and regional governments–for which we have little in the way of policy. I am not arguing that we recognize their independence, but it is in our national interest to engage them–diplomatically and economically–and to promote stability there. I have spoken frequently, and for years, about the need for a comprehensive policy for the Horn of Africa. Serious attention to the unique conditions in Somaliland and Puntland must be part of that policy.
Meanwhile, the raging conflict in central and southern Somalia is worse than ever, as a beleaguered transitional government fights a strengthened al Shebaab and allied militias. Foreign fighters have come to Somalia to fight alongside al Shebaab, including Americans, one of whom was implicated in the October terrorist attacks. Al-Qaida in East Africa thrives on the instability and has even expanded its support network south, into parts of Kenya. Yet for far too long, our policy toward Somalia has been fragmented or nonexistent. Our coun ter ter ror ism approach has been primarily tactical and has failed to confront the reasons why Somalia is not just a safe haven for al-Qaida in East Africa but a recruiting ground for increasing numbers of fighters–Somali and foreign–who are drawn to a conflict that is fueled by local and regional forces. That is why a comprehensive policy must include a serious, high-level commitment
[Page: S8981] GPO’s PDFto a sustainable and inclusive peace and why all elements of the U.S. Government need to work together toward common goals.
As in Yemen, the key to a successful strategy is the recognition that destabilizing factors in the region are linked to threats to the United States. Thus, separatism in the Ogaden or Somali region of Ethiopia, the ongoing Ethiopian-Eritrean border disputes, and the ways in which these tensions motivate the policies of these countries toward Somalia must factor into our broader regional strategy. This is complex, to be sure. But we simply have no other choice–we must recognize the complexity, understand it, and devise policies that address it.This administration has a historic opportunity. And there are indications that lessons are being learned. The Director of the National Coun ter ter ror ism Center–whom the President rightly kept on from the previous administration–recently said the following:
This is a global struggle for al-Qaida, but if we think about it too much as a global struggle and fail to identify the local events that are truly motivating people to join what they view as a global struggle, we will really miss the boat. We have to try to disaggregate al-Qaida into the localized units that largely make up the organization and attack those local issues that have motivated these individuals to see their future destiny through a global jihad banner.
This is the strategic framework that we have been waiting for, and it is encouraging.
