Reforming Yemen’s Security Services
An interesting analysis at Carnegie focuses on security services reform in Palestine, Lebanon and Yemen. A good conclusion requires an apt intial assessment, such as:
Use of military recruitment to co-opt tribesmen and of appointments to
reward personal loyalty among offi cers—especially in the army and police
force—has led to the development of a security sector that is seriously bloated,
lacking in basic equipment and specialist skills, and fraught with corruption.
The sector is widely regarded as little more than disparate “stovepipes” centered
on Saleh. Yemeni government and security institutions are completely
segmented, with minimal communication and coordination between, and
within, the ministries of interior, justice, and defense. Consequently there is
extensive overlap and duplication of functions between the police, army, and
Central Security Forces in urban areas, and rivalry that result in ineffective
policing in rural areas and along land borders…Following the USS Cole bombing in October 2000, the United States
believed Yemen’s main information-gathering agency, the Political Security
Organization, to be heavily penetrated by al-Qaeda sympathizers and lacking
analytical capability. The United States was especially dissatisfi ed with
the level of information sharing and hoped that the new National Security
Bureau would fi ll these gaps and offset, possibly replace, the Political Security
Organization. It has provided the National Security Bureau with modern communication, surveillance and data-collection systems, and occasionally with
satellite images and data, but its attempts to secure “live control” through
direct access or embedded personnel have reportedly been denied.
Second, the United States has assisted the establishment within the Ministry
of Interior of a Counter-Terrorism Unit attached to the Central Security Forces,
which are commanded by Brigadier Yahya Saleh, the President’s nephew. The
Counterterrorism Unit, a “key focal point,” has received technical assistance,
equipment, and training from the United States, which regards it as “one of our
favorite security institutions to work with because it’s new and there is no corruption.”
————Conceivably, an unabashedly narrow focus on counterterrorism might skirt
these tensions and allow the unity of purpose necessary for success. The
experience of the United States and the European Union in Yemen demonstrates
otherwise. There, the high premium placed on counterterrorism has
enabled the Yemeni government to pick and choose which donor initiatives
to allow or block. Donor offi cials, moreover, believe that President Saleh may
use the counterterrorism agenda to reinforce regime protection and suppress
dissidents. This concern is why the United Kingdom preferred the Central
Security Forces to play the main counterterrorism role from 2002 onwards,
instead of the Special Forces headed by Saleh’s son Ahmad.
On the other hand, the counterterrorism focus has resulted in the slow
progress of efforts to reform the Yemeni criminal justice system, which is
regarded by the general public as hopelessly slow, corrupt, and powerless to
enforce court decisions.
