US Cozies Up to Saddamists in Yemen
I have been writing about the impact of the thousands of Iraqis in Yemen, and especially former top Saddamists, for years. One area is the Sa’ada War, where Iraqi Ba’athists in the Yemeni military aided and instigated the war efforts against the Shiite Houthi rebels, prompting Ayatollah Sistani to call it “a pact of evil from Baghdad to Sana’a” in 2005. (And what an uproar there was…) Another area of influence is the facilitation of jihaddists from Yemen to Iraq to aid the “insurgency” there. In 2005, I detailed the Baathist input into the training of jihaddis in Yemen by “subverted” members of the intelligence and military.
The reasoning for the US working with former Saddamists in Yemen presented in the article is that the PSO is too incompetent and subverted. And that’s true. The Iraqis at least have some professionalism. The US must be that desperate to find anyone to partner with, and there’s even talk of forming yet another Yemeni security agency. But its hard to stomach an alliance with these particular Ba’athists when we tally the numbers of US troops killed by terrorists that came down the Yemeni rat trail. They are already alligned with al Qaeda, as are certain sections of the Yemeni security forces and the Yemeni adminstration.
Telegraph: Co-operation with the former Baathist officers, who fled Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasion and the fall of Saddam, is expected to grow further in the wake of the failed terror attack in the skies above Detroit.
Both Britain and the United States have pledged to bolster Yemeni efforts to take on al-Qaeda’s local affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), since it claimed responsibility for a thwarted attempt to bring down an American airliner on Christmas Day.
The US-Iraqi alliance was born out of frustration over the incompetence and suspected al-Qaeda sympathies of many within Yemen’s domestic intelligence body, the Political Security Organisation, or PSO.
“We do not know where the allegiance of many in the intelligence apparatus lies,” said a western diplomat.
According to many Yemen observers, the PSO was instrumental in the resurrection of al-Qaeda’s fortunes after it was accused of complicity in the escape of 23 terror suspects from one of its prisons in 2006.
Nasir al-Wahayshi, AQAP’s highly effective leader, and several suspects linked to the bombing of the US warship USS Cole of Aden in 2000 were among those who won their freedom.
Under pressure from the United States in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s president, created the rival National Security Agency (NSA).
It has taken credit for providing intelligence that led to air strikes last month which, Yemen claims, killed dozens of AQAP operatives
A number of former Iraqi officers, some of them members of Saddam’s feared intelligence service, the Mukhabarat, were recruited to the service.
“They are involved in training and also intelligence gathering,” said a former Yemeni security officer.
At the outset of its intervention in Iraq in 2003, the United States embarked on a rigorous policy of “de-Baathification” and disbanded the Iraqi army.
Many fled to Syria before receiving an invitation to come to Yemen from President Saleh, according to former Yemeni military officers and analysts.
“After the collapse of the Baathists in Iraq, many came to Yemen,” said Fares al-Saqqaf, a prominent analyst. “Many saw it as a transit point, but others stayed here and became government experts.”
The Yemeni president was a strong ally of Saddam, and is said to have regarded him as his mentor. He even earned the sobriquet “Little Saddam” for the way he aped the Iraqi leader by wearing a revolver holstered at the seat of his trousers.
Mr Saleh also gave refuge to the relatives of Saddam’s top henchman, including the families of Tariq Aziz, the former deputy prime minister, and Izzat al-Douri, one of the Iraqi dictator’s closest military allies.
But Mr Saleh’s allies also include a number of Salafists, whose puritanical interpretation of Islam is shared by many in al-Qaeda. Many fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, an experience that brought some into contact with Osama bin Laden.
Although a majority eschew bin Laden’s doctrine of violence, the presence of so many Salafists in the government could explain why the CIA did not tell Yemen it had received intelligence of an AQAP plot to set in motion “a Nigerian bomber.”
While acknowledging that the Americans and Iraqis do work together, a Western diplomat said the relationship remained ambiguous.
“It shouldn’t be overstated but, yes, it looks like there is some crossover,” he said.
