This time, the assault is an exercise, but Yemen’s elite Counterterrorism Unit has successfully carried out several high-risk operations against suspected terrorists and kidnappers. Portraits of six fallen soldiers, the unit’s “martyrs,” hang on the walls of their barracks. “They are without a doubt the bravest guys I have ever worked with,” says Ed, a U.S. Army trainer on his second tour in Yemen.
These days, though, Yemen is facing its own crisis, the result of deepening poverty and a government in denial about the depth of reforms needed to survive. In the past year, the United States and the World Bank have slashed their modest aid programs to Yemen, increasingly fed up with a bureaucracy that is one of the most corrupt in the world. “Yemen is teetering on the edge of failed statehood,” warns one U.S. official. “It will either become a Somalia or get serious about transforming.” For a nation awash in guns and crisscrossed by well-worn smuggling routes, the threat is grave.
(The 17) The group was captured after U.S. intelligence passed a tip to Yemeni security forces.
“This is a country that is really in the balance,” says Thomas Krajeski, the U.S. ambassador to Yemen. “There is a risk here for failure, and there is a chance of success. It is our job to give them all the help we can, but they have to make some hard decisions now.”
Increasingly, however, Yemenis fear that the strongman who has ruled for 28 years will be unable or unwilling to make the tough reforms needed. “The Americans are happy because they found someone who will fight terrorism,” says Mutawakil. “But my fear is that we’re establishing the foundation for terrorism in the country, just as they did in Iraq.” He is particularly concerned about what he calls Saleh’s “divide and conquer” style.
Amid all this, Yemen has somehow managed to remain one of the most democratic nations in the (admittedly autocratic) Middle East–and one of the very few with a relatively free press. The government tolerates a raft of opposition parties and independent newspapers. Yemenis, for the most part, feel free to criticize the government, and even Saleh, in public.
The democratic reforms all stop short of threatening Saleh’s rule
The final straw came when her staff recorded “appalling cheating” by government officials during a by-election for a parliament seat. “This past year, the scales dropped from our eyes,” she says. “We’re tired of promises. We’re tired of good intentions. < > It comes to a point when it’s not enough to say that you held the country together as it fell down the tubes.”
“In the past, we have been lenient when it comes to accountability,” says Qirbi, the foreign minister. “Now we are making the people who are responsible accountable for any poor performance. We have overcome a major obstacle, which is admitting that there are deficits.”
“We have maybe the worst educational quality in the world,” says Arhabi, the minister of planning. “I have myself seen students in sixth grade, who if you ask them to pronounce the alphabet, they aren’t able to finish it. Forget about reading and writing.”
Even worse, some corruption is officially sanctioned. As many as 60,000 people are receiving at least two government salaries, often doled out officially to buy their loyalty. “Many of the double dippers are tribal sheiks or military people,” says Yahya al-Mutawakel, the vice minister of planning.
Perhaps the brightest is the Social Fund for Development, an independent government agency that helps build schools, clinics, roads, and water wells funded mostly by foreign nations. With only 150 full-time employees, the fund managed some 1,000 projects last year with an $80 million budget. The fund–and Arhabi, its director–win nearly universal praise from foreign donors for their integrity and exhaustive accounting system. The secret: highly paid employees and the ability to fire staff at will.
Underlying any discussion of reform, however, is one uncomfortable factor–nobody can picture Yemen without Saleh in charge. Even his most implacable critics fret that there is no viable alternative today
“I expect more dangerous risks in Yemen–extremism and fanaticism,” he says. “But it’s not related to religion. It comes out of the failure to satisfy life’s needs.”
For many, the upcoming local and presidential elections will be a test. And the stakes are high. “What we are afraid of is that the Yemeni people will lose hope in elections as a means of change,” Sabri says, “because this is what the traditional forces want.”
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