lt cdrmohammed abd uallah muthanna taher

Kadar, who regularly shares his faith with Muslims in the city of Oran, was discussing his belief in Christ with a man at an outdoor food court last May when the man became angry and accused Kadar of insulting Muhammad. Police arrested Kadar and found a large amount of Christian materials in his apartment.

Read more: http://www.maghrebchristians.com/2012/04/24/believer-awaits-appeal-decision-after-shaking-the-faith-of-muslims/#ixzz1sxG1jXZ2

Youssef

The Critical Threats Project has launched a tracker to follow the escalating conflict in southern Yemen.
Disease complain about the conditions suffered by the south and southerners after the war as a result of policies of exclusion and marginalization they suffered from separation of tens of thousands of southerners from the corps of civil and military personnel from their jobs, in addition to looting is especially for the land in the south, where the area represents about 65% of the territory of Yemen, but a population estimated at about 25-30% only and the lack of returns for the local population, especially of oil which is extracted mostly – about 80% – from the south in Hadramout, Shabwa in particular. In addition to widespread poverty, unemployment and corruption in Yemen in general began to dramatically demonstration rallies on the anniversary of the fall of Aden on 7/7/2007 in the city of Aden and occasional demonstrations do not stop in the south, which is termed at termed a peaceful movement’s southern consensus organizers of the demonstrations on the use of force and resort of demonstrations and sit-ins only

we hope U.S friend to support our southern movement against north occupation

There is a blackout. Even in the GCC initiative, there was a small clause at the end, stressing the unity of Yemen. But it is difficult in these days to block such a cause. The world is an open place.

Is there a pro-unification GCC policy?

During the last period, there was a planned media blackout of the Southern cause. There was no news on South Yemen, despite all its miseries and desperation. Sana’a’s budget is fuelled by the South’s riches, while our people suffer homelessness, hunger and dismissal from government. Of course, there is something. Such a situation could not be unintentional. But time is capable of restoring everything. We ask our brothers and neighbours in the GCC to pay attention to the South and its people, and to reconsider their stances. And then, we could form better relations; the Southerners have never had any bearing.

How would an independent South Yemen be like?

We are struggling now to get rid of dozens of Northern occupation brigades. We are also working on strengthening and deepening reconciliation in the South. We have witnessed eras of internal divisions before and after the first independence. But we have good signs of reconciliation and national unity. We extend our hand to all factions without discrimination and regardless of past differences to build a democratic parliamentary and federal Yemen. We want a federal state in South Yemen, a country that involved throughout its history Sheikhdoms and Sultanates. We need a different way of thinking and governing this country, away from central government, and to seriously consider federalism in an independent South Yemen. After unification, we went to Sana’a, where we found a militarized tribal society that rejects modernising the administration, improving state performance, creating a civil society, or reforming the state to become democratic. In the South, we aspire to establish a state that coexists with everyone and build its relations with our brothers across the borders, or with the world. We will exhaust our efforts to eradicate all conspiracies to plant terrorism in the South. There is a conspiracy to display the South as a safe haven for terrorism; this is mistaken, what we have is exported by Sana’a, specifically from the presidential palace. They (Northerners) want to tell the world that the South will fail at building its own state, that we will dissolve again and become a safe haven for terrorists. Such a reputation is harmful to our cause.

When we ruled The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, before the ominous and treacherous unification, there were no pirates in the Arab sea or Eden’s gulf. I believe that our independence and building our new state will create a friendly environment for good relations with the world based on exchanging benefits and working full-force against all forms of terrorism. We know where terrorism was exported from. Saleh created this scare crow to extort Western financial, economic and military assistance. This situation will end when Southerners reclaim their country; we will make use of various experiences in this aspect. We are committed with the different strata of our society, with no exception, and including the Sultans, businessmen, academics and civil society to build a democratic country.

From 1994 till 2009, there were 15 years of political silence in Oman; have you used this time for reflection on the past’s mistakes, errors or misjudgements?

The re-evaluation is not personal. In both the national and peaceful movements, such reassessments occur. We have good cadres and academics who look back recognizing the need to eliminate the past’s residues, and look forward to a pluralistic and tolerant society. During our independence years, we had one political party, and then after unification, we tried to open the door for political pluralism, but it was too late. After all these years, we are exerting efforts to establish a democratic pluralism, and to open the door for wide participation and tolerance. We do have a true re-assessment of the past, but it is not personal. I and many other leaders of the peaceful movement who live in exile have learned from our experiences; we have great hope that we can offer a better model.

In a nutshell, what were the effects of the North’s domination on the South?

What happened during those two decades led hundreds of thousands of Southerners to demonstrate and demand freedom from this backward and barbaric occupation. Many things happened. Before unification, The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’s public sector employed no less than 600 thousand people. Our big government policy was known. Our population was about 5-6 million, while the North had 20 millions people, while their public sector employees did not employ more than 200 thousand. 600 thousand workers became unemployed; they establish what is known as “stay at home party”. They were real and professional cadres; we spent a lot of money on training them. The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was the only Arab country that eliminated illiteracy through an effective program; today, under this occupation, illiteracy rates have risen to 60%.

There is also an intentional sabotage of our Southern culture, stealing our natural wealth, and erasing our history. They even replaced famous names of streets, mostly to commemorate popular martyrs. Saleh’s regime also fostered a culture of revenge between Southern tribes in a divide and rule strategy.

Through unification, Southerners dreamed of going forward and developing, but we were dragged into a miserable heart-breaking situation. They destroyed everything. We were two states, two regimes, and we agreed to unification according to signed plans that were scrapped. Then, no less than 150 Southern cadres were assassinated. This situation led us to signing an agreement in Jordan in February 1994, months before the war erupted. After the agreement, I told my brothers in the leadership that the agreement will lead to war. The first clause calls for the arrest of those behind the assassinations; but in reality, they were all Saleh’s men and relatives, and he will not touch them. They fought a destructive war against us in the South where they destroyed the beautiful city of Eden, an international cultural hub. God willing, we will rebuild it. We are a nation of 5-6 million over a land of 336,000 squared kilometres; the North has more than 20 million people over 195,000 squared kilometres. The resources that fuel Sana’a’s budget are mostly in the South; while our people are poor and many times homeless. This is why people rose up, not because of our political activism, but as a result of this tribal and military occupation. God willing, we will regain our independence.

You and many Southerners stress the cultural differences between the South and North. Can you elaborate on that?

In the South, there is potential for creating and encouraging a civil society. At the time of unification, we, the Southerners, tried to improve our model, as both sides had agreed to take the best elements of the two former regimes. We introduced an economic reform program; it was passed in parliament but not implemented. We demanded that in every town where you have a policeman, there should be a court. Such demands were scrapped. Saleh oversees tribal fiefdoms. In every tribal Sheikh’s house, there is a prison. Outside Sana’a, Ta’izz, and Hodeidah, there is no government. There are ruling tribal sheikhs who run their affairs in coordination with Saleh, usually via his most preferred way, the telephone, rather than institutions.

We have two cultures, two views on the way of life. We found ourselves very different from the North in all walks of life. All the rhetoric on “our Yemen” and unification failed in practice. The North had no will to change its ways; the trio of the military, tribal leaders and Islamists like (Sheikh Abdul Majeed) Zindani wield too much influence.

Southern leaders are now divided between pro-independence, like yourself, and the GCC supported federalists. How do you justify this split?

In the South, there are two projects. The first is the federal project whose proponents are unable to hold a single meeting on the streets because of popular rejection. The second is the independence movement represented by us, and the Peaceful Movement.

Is there an organisational/hierarchical link with the Peaceful movement?

Of course. A higher leadership council runs the movement; its president is Hussein Ahmed Baoum who was moved this week from a Yemeni prison to Saudi Arabia after his health deteriorated. I agree with all of the movement’s principles and decisions. They are now preparing a conference, leading to a wider national (Southern) conference; all the other brothers are welcome to attend.

Another project, in addition to aforementioned two, is the state of Hadramut. Proponents believe that such a state has the potential to become the Arab Sea’s Singapore after the passage of oil pipelines. We hope that even those brothers join us in this conference; we welcome all Southerners, even those who are with the current regime.

Are you committed to peaceful means in your cause?

Yes. There are efforts to drag us into violence, and there might be an on the ground decision to take some action to preserve the peaceful nature of our movement. But this is not my decision to make. Since 2007, we have committed to peaceful protest, and the Arab spring revolutions have followed on the same track. We consider this “Our Southern copyrights”.

The Time asked last year whether the current security gap in the South might lead to an independence declaration, is that on the table?

It is not that easy. There are still security forces, and control tools. We are trying to raise the effectiveness of the peaceful movement and strengthen its ranks. The re-assessment was scheduled for this month, but we had to reschedule to face the upcoming and imposed election of the current Vice President. Voting for one person! This is a novelty in democracy. They have also created problems in the South. Ali Mohsen Ahmar and Ali Saleh, while they are fighting each other in the rest of the country, conspire against us in the South. In Zanzibar, Saleh brought some of his Islamist allies, which he claims to be from alQaeda; while Ali Mohsen’s units have brought Ansar Sharia from the other side. They started implementing Sharia laws; those who steal five dollars have their hands amputated, whereas those responsible for extorting billions are left unscathed. We demand the assistance of international organisations in holding a referendum for Southern independence. Southerners have reminded the United Nations’ Security Council in letters of its two resolutions during the 1994 war. Our mission is to reject the elections; let the northerners do whatever they want with it, as the South is unconcerned. We are bothered by the shameful Arab and international silence and intentional blackout over our cause; we urge them to change course. In particular, the British position is the most troubling; they ruled us for 129 years. If they want to understand, they could and would, but there are important interests and maybe, who knows, Washington’s guiding hand. We hope they change course and help the Southern people who is resolute in his quest for independence.

You face a difficult and complex regional situation. But you recently welcomed any regional support to your cause, did you mean Iran?

I have said more than once that we will welcome any rapprochement and support. This applies to everyone and not a single side. I wish that there will be support to the people of the South; we are the victims.

What will you give in return?

Nothing. We reject any conditions. The reward is meeting their human responsibility in eliminating grievances and prejudices.

Do you have any relations with Houthi rebels?

They have changed their position, and now support our right to self determination. They will have a future role in the North.

What do you say to Southerners today?

I call for widening the participation in the peaceful movement, reassessing our experience in the past five years, innovation new ways of peaceful resistance and looking after the youth generation. I expect this year to be that of victories

67Interviews by HRW/Middle East, Sana’a, Yemen, late July 1994. The journalists requested anonymity.
68The damage to the pumping station at Bir Nasir was in sharp contrast to damage from shelling and bombardment in towns
such as Subr, where rubble and jagged walls left the distinct visual evidence of battle.
69The ICRC provided two new generators for the station, but the regular water supply was not restored even by the end of July
because of the damage to the storage tanks, mining near damaged wells, the damage to other pumping stations such as Bir
Ahmed, and the still undetected damage to pipes at many different locations by shelling.
70Interview, Aden, Yemen, July 20, 1994.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 17 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
Aden. The UN promised emergency landmine sweeping assistance.71
At Bir Ahmad, a supplementary pumping and water storage station one hour northwest of Aden, there was
also damage to both the machinery and the storage system. The two storage tanks had large gaping holes appeared
to be caused by direct deliberate hits from weapons such as tank guns or RPGs. Debris in the area indicated fighting
around the village (not visible from the station), and a rebel military base about one kilometer away (the base was
visible from the pumping station). However, the gaping holes in the water tanks did not appear to be the result of
battle but of other direct attacks as in Bir Ahmed; there was conspicuously little damage to the other structures at
the pumping station.
PILLAGE
Pillage and extensive destruction of property not justified by military necessity occurred during and after the
war, primarily in Aden after government forces gained control of that last rebel-held city, but also in many other
cities that changed hands during the war.
Destruction and Pillage of Civilian Objects
Pillage, which includes looting or taking booty or spoils of war, is forbidden by the laws of war.72 This
prohibition covers individual acts without the consent of the military authorities and also organized pillage. The
ordering or authorization of pillage is forbidden, and the parties are obliged to prevent or, if it has commenced, to
stop individual pillage. All types of property, whether private, communal, cooperative, state, or other, are protected,
although the military authorities retain the right to requisition goods under certain conditions.73 The purpose of this
principle is to spare people the suffering resulting from the destruction of their real and personal property.74
Destruction of property not absolutely necessary on account of military operations also is forbidden. Both
pillage and unnecessary destruction are forbidden by customary international humanitarian law governing even
internal armed conflicts.75
Government soldiers and officers in Aden were observed by eyewitnesses in Aden to be engaging in
extensive organized looting followed by pillage; they also failed to stop the civilian looters. It was separatist
officials, however, who began the looting of Aden in the final days of the war, no doubt sensing imminent defeat.
When the war was over many northern officials, foreigners, and others went or returned to Aden; those who
arrived quickly observed looting by civilians and northern forces. Observers estimated that 25-30 percent of the
looting was well organized and on a large scale; looters arrived in trucks and larger vehicles and loaded up
equipment and machinery from the port and elsewhere, using cranes to lift the heavier pieces. Large numbers of
vehicles were engaged in this effort even though there was a shortage of vehicles for the water emergency.
The property destruction seemed to target mainly the records, property, and institutions of the former
PDRY, now technically the property of the Republic of Yemen. This destruction was tolerated and often authored by
government forces.

71Interview, UNDP Resident Representative Dr. Awni S. al-Ani, Sana’a, Yemen, July 31, 1994.
72IV Geneva, Article 33.
73ICRC, Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention (Geneva: ICRC, 1958), pp. 226-27.
74Ibid., p. 226.
75IV Geneva, Article 53; Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989), pp. 46-47.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 18 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
A precedent for the destruction and looting of opposition political targets by government forces appears to
have been established in the tank and mortar attack on the YSP headquarters in Sana’a on the morning of May 5.
Five or six guards and two men working the press in the adjacent newspaper office were taken prisoner. The
building was blown open with a large explosion and entered by men and boys who carried off doors, desks, office
supplies, and Socialist campaign posters and materials. Security police later surrounded the complex, watching as it
caught fire and burned.
On the same day there were similar attacks on private homes of politicians allied with the south, including
that of Mujahid al-Quhali, a northern Member of Parliament representing the al-Tashih (Correction) party.76 He
avoided arrest since he was then in Aden, but his male relatives and guards were arrested and the house was looted
down to the electrical and plumbing fixtures. Similar targeted attacks are said to have occurred in other locations.77
There was also looting when towns changed hands. At al-Ataq, center of Shabwa governorate, for instance,
only two hospital mattresses remained by the time civilian government officials arrived. All Lahj hospitals were
looted and inoperable half way through the war. In Mukalla, where there was no battle and no power vacuum,
public offices, schools, and buildings were also looted. Vacated homes elsewhere, such as in deserted villages and
bombed buildings on the outskirts of Aden, were occasionally robbed of small items such as gold rings, but they did
not suffer systematic looting. It was not always possible to know who was responsible for each incident, but the
frequency of the looting indicated a failure to prevent if not active encouragement of looting.
Pillage in Aden reached massive proportions in four waves between about July 4 and July 14.78 The first
stage of looting was carried out by separatist political and military leaders as they prepared to escape the city.79
Many witnessed looting during the days before Aden fell; for instance, a journalist saw southern soldiers and
civilians looting private northern businesses, including the large luxury Gold Muhur Hotel which was later re-looted
by northern forces.
In the second stage, guards and police throughout the city abandoned their posts before government forces
entered on July 6-7. The police and guards, who effectively had served the separatist government, not only feared
arrest by government soldiers, but also found it necessary to stay home to protect their personal property from
looters. Seeing no impediment to theft, some displaced persons and Aden residents mobbed warehouses in the port
and elsewhere, took tables and chairs from school houses used by the displaced, and generally helped themselves to
whatever was available. About 7,000 tons of food was looted by soldiers and civilians from the U.N. warehouse at
Dar Saad before the war ended, and on July 10 a relief official watched helplessly as women and children removed
the remaining 1,000 tons of cooking oil.

76As one of many shaykhs from the Bakil tribal confederation (which unlike Hashid does not have a paramount shaykh), al-
Quhali had participated in a Bakil gathering near Amran in April that the government considered a provocation to war, according
to a female relative.
77Interviews with eyewitnesses, Sana’a, Yemen, May 6.
78The London-based Arabic daily al-Hayat in its July 24, 1994 edition cited a “Yemeni report” that the plunder included the goods
of 108 branches (offices or operations) of Ministries and public sector companies, eleven factories, thirty-five schools and
educational facilities, and 1,200 vehicles, mostly government property.

79Attorney General Muhammad al-Badri accused the head of the Ma’alla police station and the then-governor of Aden, al-Siylli,
of encouraging the looting of the commercial property of Sana’a merchants, and he claimed that other separatist officials
ordered destruction of financial records that allegedly would document their past embezzlement. Interview, Sana’a, Yemen, July
28, 1994. Along with most other high-ranking government officials, al-Badri was in Aden for about two weeks right after the war
ended. Separatists made almost identical claims of destruction of evidence in the aftermath of the war by individuals allied
with the government.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 19 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
From July 7 through July 10 or 11 was the third stage: thousands of government troops, volunteers, out-oftown
looters and finally souvenir-hunters streamed into Aden. Some observed “food convoys” entering Aden, each
truck carrying a few sheep and as many as ten armed men who used the sheep to bribe their way past checkpoints.80
During this period no orders were given to halt the looting. No steps were taken by the government which controlled
the city to restore order, although many northern officials were then in Aden. For instance, Judge al-Hitar of the
criminal court in Sana’a and president of the Yemeni Human Rights Organization, arrived in Aden the day after the
city fell and stayed three days, during which time he saw police and uniformed government soldiers looting public
property, including buses belonging to a hospital.81
In this wave, soldiers engaged in extensive looting and vandalism, specifically targeting government offices,
public sector enterprises, Socialist Party offices and newspapers, and the vacated offices of international
organizations. These were both looted and vandalized as soldiers and officers “requisitioned” equipment and
furnishings and also deliberately wrecked files, electrical fuse boxes, and windows. At the palatial YSP
headquarters, for example, the floors were thick with newspaper clippings, old YSP conference resolutions,
calendars, and unreeled movie film, and the paneling and stained glass were punctured, probably by rifle-butt.82
During the fourth and final stage, ending between July 14 and 11, soldiers opened fire on the few remaining
civilian looters and set up dozens of checkpoints around town and on the highways with orders, finally, to confiscate
stolen goods and unlicensed weapons. In some cases, however, checkpoint guards simply kept a proportion of the
booty. Weapons, vehicles, air conditioners, desks, office and house/hotel furnishings and personal items flooded al-
Rahida and other markets just north of the former border.
The damage in Aden has been estimated initially by the U.N. at $100-200 million dollars U.S., according to
Yemeni officials. Specific sites and property looted include the UNDP, UNHCR, and Ministry of Health/WHO
offices, the Ministry of Justice, the public textile factory, the cigarette factory (80 percent privately owned), the
state-owned Seera Beer factory, the British, German, Italian, and Russian consulates, the offices of Elf Acquitaine
and Canadian Occidental, the Chamber of Commerce, the offices of the Organization for the Defense of Democratic
Rights and Liberties (a nongovernmental human rights group), Mansoura Prison (including the carpentry workshop),
the administrative offices and many large warehouses of the Domestic Trade Corporation (a large state-owned
trading company), all YSP and independent newspaper offices, the YSP headquarters, the Aden Movenpik Hotel,
Gold Muhur and other private and public sector hotels, all of Aden’s museums, the city’s sanitation trucks, vehicles
from Yemeni and international institutions, and all the docking facilities and warehouses at the port. The hospitals
where ICRC delegates were stationed throughout the conflict were not looted on the inside, but all ambulances and
other objects in the hospital courtyards were taken.83
Some of the property later was recovered but much was lost to Aden forever. During HRW/Middle East’s
stay in Aden in late July, the delegation had occasion to see many people, including civil servants brought in from
the north, complain to the police about looted property and buildings occupied by government soldiers or officers.
Although a few places, including two consulates, were entered forcibly while people were inside, almost all

80On July 21, 1994, there were eleven prisoners in jail in Mansour Prison near Aden; all were accused of looting. One said he, and
five other prisoners there, were from Ibb in the former North Yemen. They came to Aden after the government victory. Although
admittedly armed, they had no problem passing through army checkpoints.
81Interview, Sana’a, Yemen, July 25, 1994.
82The large four-story building is scheduled for use by Aden University. One hopes faculty and librarians will be permitted to
reconstruct historical files without political interference.
83Staff of donor organizations privately commented that they were offended by government requests to replace equipment the
staff knew was looted by soldiers.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 20 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
buildings were empty of people when looted. A Pakistani family defended the al-Shams Motel simply by standing
outside. There is no record of deaths during the looting. Many empty private offices were broken into and looted of
valuable office equipment. Some private homes were burgled, but few were looted.
The forty-year-old oil refinery at Little Aden had burned for days during the war, and later was looted
extensively.84
A group of office workers and mechanics at a public company vociferously complained to HRW/Middle
East that they had come to work at 9:00 A.M. the morning the government soldiers entered Aden, but were
prevented from entering their workplace — even to retrieve their personnel files proving their employment and rights
to pensions and other benefits — by government soldiers standing guard. An hour and a half later they returned and
found the building still guarded but on fire and surrounded by looted goods. They angrily accused the government
forces of economic warfare and colonialism.
The proportion of total damage committed by civilian Islamists, members of the Islah party, is probably
relatively minor in light of the extensive destruction done by others, but it attracted attention because it targeted
what they saw as symbols of decadence and Westernization: the Seera beer factor in Mansoura,85 the Aden
Movenpik Hotel, and liquor warehouses and private supplies.
What appears to have happened at the Seera Beer plant is that the Islamist militants (identified by an
eyewitness who called them “the bearded ones”) arrived after the machinery had already been ruined by government
soldiers.86 A journalist who saw the fire was told by a government army colonel on the spot that government troops
set the fire.87 An opposition politician in Aden, Omar al-Jawi of the Al-Tajammu’ Party, was told by local Islah Party
members, in particular by parliamentarian Jaabel Jaiman, that they were proud to take credit for the burning of the
beer factory and all the bottled beer in it.88
Most of the smashing by Islamists of an estimated $7 million dollars U.S. store of hard liquor taken from a
government warehouse, and other liquor seized from private homes, took place in front of news cameras near the
Gold Muhur Hotel. The looting of the Aden Movenpik Hotel89 was far less thorough than of the Trade Corporation
or Justice Ministry.

84One journalist reported from Aden reported that two north Yemeni warplanes hit the refinery with cluster bombs sending a
massive column of black smoke and flames hundreds of feet into the air. Eric Watkins, “Bombed Aden goes about its business,”
Financial Times (London), June 8, 1994.
85The Aden government, sensitive to northern war propaganda, announced near the end of June that the brewery, which netted
$8 million dollars U.S. profit in 1993, would be converted into a soft drink factory. It was the only brewery in Yemen. “Al-Bid
Decree Turns Brewery Into Soft Drinks Factory,” Paris AFP in English, Aden, Yemen, June 27, 1994, cited in FBIS-NES-94-124 (June
28, 1994), p. 37.
86The plant had over eight multi-story vats and a large bottling operation. The plant and the vats had gaping holes in them, as
from a tank gun or RPG.
87Interviewed in Sana’a, Yemen, August 1, on condition of anonymity. He said the flames of the fire were eighty feet high and the
smoke “created a second horizon.” A reporter for the official al-Thawrah newspaper attempted to excuse the fire, claiming it
began accidentally when gunfire “spontaneously ignited” the “alcohol in the beer.” Interview, Seera beer factory, Mansoura,
Aden, July 23, 1994.
88Interview, Aden, Yemen, July 19, 1994. Discussions are now underway for conversion of the site to a mosque.
89Alcohol was being served to the government officials living on the unlooted (but also unairconditioned) sixth and seventh
upper floors of the Aden Movenpick Hotel in late July. The service elevator remained in operation, but the main elevator was said
to have been mistaken for a safe and shot open by northern “volunteers.”

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 21 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
After the looting spree subsided in mid-July, there were a few incidents of vandalizing directed at a few
Christian churches and cemeteries and other non-Muslim places of worship90 by unidentified people. On July 21, the
cross was broken and a statue damaged by gunfire at St. Francis Church in Tawahi.91 On July 15, men in a military
vehicle demanded that the nuns at the Mother Theresa Home in Aden open the doors of the car shed and the church
storehouse, but the nuns, who had a letter from the police promising protection, refused. Later, two Aden mosques
reportedly were desecrated by Islamist militants.92
In addition to the looting, some Ali Nasir supporters on their own initiative re-occupied forty to sixty villas
in which they had formerly resided, including villas luxury already rented to international organizations like
Swedish Save the Children and foreign oil companies.93 Three judges have been assigned to give priority to the
property issues raised by these cases. Typical of the confusion in post-war Aden were official statements on the
problem, each varying widely from the next: the Minister of the Interior claimed the police have the authority to
evict the Ali Nasir squatters without a court order. One judge said no one could evict them without an order and,
because of looting, and destruction of Ministry of Justice property the courts had not reopened. A foreign national
employed by an oil company complained to the police that he had an order awarding the company possession of a
villa for which it had paid rent, but the colonel occupying it since Aden fell would not move out and no police or
army official had the nerve to dislodge him.
There was no evidence in late July of efforts to bring looters to justice as a means of complying with the
duty to prevent and stop pillage. The Aden Justice Ministry and courts, still sorting through files strewn on the floor
to identify what was missing or destroyed, had not resumed operation when the State of Emergency was lifted on
July 27. The prosecutor’s office was not yet functioning, and police stations were being run by new appointees and
volunteers. Although ranking interior ministry officials at the Tariq camp in Aden claimed that about 200 persons
had been arrested for looting, the officials were not clear about where the looters were being held. The Mansoura
Prison, where we were first told to look, held a mere eleven prisoners detained after the main looting was over,
including a fourteen-year-old boy and six men traveling together from a village in Ibb governorate. One assured us
the Ibb group had seen no judicial officials but would be released “within a few days.”94
During a visit to the Radfan army camp,95 also suggested by the authorities as the place where looters might
be held, the officer in charge said they had no looters but assured us that 200 looters had been transferred to police
stations in Aden. At the Ma’alla police station, visited without appointment, we were told by those in charge that
they did not have any looters in custody, nor had they ever received any looters, nor ever detained any looters, nor
received “authorization” to use force to detain looters or prevent looting.96 The Attorney General later said that sixty
looters were arrested after being caught in the act, but they were released because it was unfair to prosecute so few

90There is no Yemeni Christian community; churches serve the foreign community. The few remaining Yemeni Jews continue to
be evacuated by an American committee that has pursued this project for several years; one group of about twenty-five Yemeni
Jews from al-Rayda near Amran left as part of this program on August 2, 1994.
91See “Muslim Fundamentalists Said to Attack Aden Church,” Paris AFP in English, Aden, Yemen, July 23, 1994, cited in FBIS-NES-
94-142 (July 25, 1994), p. 35.
92Shaher Musa’bain, “A Showdown in Aden,” Yemen Times, Vol. IV, Issue No. 35 (Sana’a: September 5-12, 1994), p. 1.
93The Ali Nasir supporters, defeated in internal YSP fighting in 1986, abandoned the villas the socialist government had
assigned them in keeping with their government rank when they fled north to the YAR. After unification in 1990 the villas were
privatized and the then-residents had the right to purchase them on easy terms.
94Interviews, Mansoura Prison, Aden, July 21, 1994.
95Interview, Radfan army base, Khor Maksur, Aden, July 23, 1994. Similarly, we were told there was a warehouse where looted
goods could be claimed by owners, but not able to see it. At Radfan officers said all goods had been returned to their owners.
96Interview, Ma’ala, Aden, Yemen, July 24, 1994.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 22 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
among so many who participated in the looting.97
Judicial authorities in Sana’a had brought to the government’s attention, before the conflict ended, the need
to take measures at the time of victory to prevent just the type of extensive looting and pillage that took place in
Aden. Criminal court judge Hamud al-Hitar, also president of the Yemeni Human Rights Organization, held a
meeting with the Ministry of Defense before the war’s end and requested that special checkpoints be set up to
prevent looting and a special tribunal be created to punish looters. He also personally asked President Salih to take
extraordinary measures to protect public and private property. The president asked him to form a special court which
started functioning at the beginning of June in al-Rahida, but it never received the full cooperation of the military so
it was powerless.
DETENTIONS DURING THE CONFLICT
While the always-chaotic criminal justice system came to a halt during the State of Emergency, the security
system continued to carry out political detentions. The old Central Security (amn al-Markazi) of the YAR and State
Security (amn al-Dawla) of the PDRY had been proclaimed dissolved after unification. They were later officially
merged into and replaced by a unified Political Security apparatus (amn al-Siyassi). In fact, although the security
forces operated with less cloak-and-dagger intimidation after unity, both State Security and Central Security retained
powerful networks of informants, armed troops, and unofficial prisons.98
Between May 5 and July 7, security forces of both parties to the conflict detained hundreds of civilians
suspected of sympathizing with the other side. To their credit, the parties accepted the ICRC’s request that it be
permitted to conduct repeated and confidential visits with persons detained in connection with the conflict. By June
23, the ICRC registered 2,834 military and civilian persons detained by both sides in connection with the war, and
started to inform families of their whereabouts.99 This ICRC notice to family members was particularly useful
because security forces, ignoring their responsibilities before the war times, ordinarily do not advise a family of
detention even when asked.100
DETENTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT
Within days after the war began, there were reports of wide-spread arrests of civilians in Sana’a, Taiz, and
Hodeida, mostly by what were referred to as government Political Security (al-Amn al-Siyassi) and Military
Intelligence (Istikhbarat askari). Groups of soldiers entered homes in every part of Sana’a in search of “socialists” or
“communists” and took dozens of persons into custody. Although authorities justified the detentions on the grounds
that arrested persons were hoarding weapons or planning guerrilla warfare, no charges were presented to any court,
and officials approached by relatives usually denied that family members were in custody.
A declaration of a State of Emergency by the Presidential Council in Sana’a on May 5 was made pursuant to

97Interview, Sana’a, Yemen, July 28, 1994. He also noted that the general amnesty was not intended to apply to this crime.
98This was so well-known and resented that it was the subject in a section of the Amman Accord of February 20, 1994, which
provided for reorganization of the Interior Ministry so that the various security units, including Central Security, would be
merged and under the control of the Ministry. Pledge and Accord Document, III, The Security and Military Aspect, para. 8, Amman
Al-Ra’y, February 19, 1994, cited in FBIS-NES(Jordan)-94-035, February 22, 1994, p. 33.
99ICRC “Special Appeal for the ICRC’s operation in Yemen” (Geneva: June 23, 1994), p. 3.
100The ICRC had been providing the same notification service for the estimated 5,700 detainees it visited in seventeen places of
detention from 1993-April 1994. Ibid., p. 2.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 23 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
a 1963 YAR law,101 and it was approved by the compliant quorum in Parliament for an initial thirty days and two
additional thirty-day periods before the Minister of Interior suspended it on July 27, a week before its scheduled
expiration.102
However, the provisions of the 1963 legislation or of the State of Emergency itself were little known: even
among members of the judiciary, officials of the Ministry of Interior, and police officers there was confusion as to if
and where the declaration of State of Emergency had been published, and as to its provisions.103
The murky legal basis of the State of Emergency was exacerbated by the uncodified northern penal codes,
the absence of any federal State of Emergency legislation applicable in the former PDRY even after unity,104 and the
customary impunity of police and especially political security forces.
Those arrested during the State of Emergency had no legal protection whatsoever, no access to counsel or
their families, and were not charged with any crime before a judge. Under Article 4 (3) ICCPR, acceded to on
February 9, 1987, Yemen has the duty to “immediately inform” other states parties of its derogation from (or
suspension of) any of the rights in that Covenant. It must provide notice by filing with the UN Secretary General.
The notice must specify the provisions of the Covenant that are suspended. As of October, however, the UN Treaty
Office, the place where such filings are kept, had received no notice of any derogation whatsoever from Yemen.
The government therefore was obliged to respect the ICCPR rights to due process and freedom from
arbitrary arrest (Articles 9 and 14), to free speech and assembly (Articles 19 and 22) and to be free from arbitrary
searches of one’s home (Article 17), among other rights. In addition to civilian detainees, there were thousands of
separatist combatants taken prisoner. Most were released from a camp near Sana’a by July 27, after some “political
indoctrination” (tawjih al-siyassi).
Torture and ill-treatment of civilian and military detainees was widespread, according to Amnesty
International.105 These rights to physical integrity may never be suspended, even during war. Although several
thousand detainees were released at the end of the conflict, perhaps hundreds remained in jail weeks after the
amnesty was announced. The government since advised that they had been released.
Available evidence shows a campaign of selective political arrests against mid-and-lower-ranking socialists,
their allies, associates and employees, independent regime critics, and even their male family members during the
war.
Five armed guards, one guest, and two print-machine operators were arrested at the Central Committee of
the YSP in Sana’a,106 after being overcome by an army attack on that large building on May 5. They were not given

101Presidential Decree, Law 8 of 1963, governed states of emergency. Under the Yemen 1990 constitution, however, this law only
applied to what was the YAR.
102About eleven of the fifty-six YSP members of Parliament remained in Sana’a after the war broke out.
103Anyone out after about 11:00 P.M. was liable to be stopped and searched at security checkpoints even before the war and the
State of Emergency. The ban on weapons was unenforced and unenforceable, however, given widespread gun ownership. The
city of Aden was different: since colonial days the law forbade handguns inside the city and even the jambiyya, a dagger
customarily worn by Yemeni men.
104Although the 1990 Constitution authorizes states of emergency, the necessary enabling legislation does not appear to have
been passed by Parliament as would be necessary to fill in the broad constitutional authority.
105Amnesty International, “Yemen: Human rights concerns following recent armed conflict,” AI Index: MDE 31/06/94 (London:
September 1, 1994), p.4.
106They included Taha Hizam al-Maqtari, Muhsin al-Miswari, Yahya al-Miswari (guards) Naji Daifallah al-Maghrabi (guest), Jamal

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 24 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
an opportunity to surrender but were fired upon by tanks and other weapons.107
Nine persons were captured at the home of Mujahid al-Quhali108 following an army attack on those premises
on May 5. Like those detained at YSP headquarters, they remained in custody under the auspices of Military
Intelligence109 well after the end of the State of Emergency and long after the announced general amnesty. With one
exception, they were held incommunicado and without charges until the end of the State of Emergency;110 those
arrested at the al-Quhali home, were released on August 25, not having seen the sun in sixty-two days.111
Tahir Shamsan was a journalist with al-Shoura, a weekly newspaper belonging to a small liberal-Islamist
party that had openly criticized both the YSP and the Sana’a government before the war.112 At the end of May he
was seized by two soldiers in broad daylight and taken to the ground floor of Political Security prison, where he was
held with forty common prisoners (“criminals and crazy people,” he called them) who had food brought by their
families. He was interrogated by Military Intelligence about his finances, personal life, and associates; accused of
being a separatist, a Saudi agent, and a critic of the ulema (religious scholars); and released after three days.
’Ali Maqnun, YSP member and an employee of the Central Bank, was arrested at his home at 10:00 P.M. on
Thursday, May 5, and taken first to the North Sana’a district security station, then to Central Security. The next day
he and about 300 others were gathered at Political Security. He spent three days in a cell with about fifty other
persons, both fellow YSP members and “youths from the streets,” before being released with over thirty others.113
His telephones remained out of order on July 31. The telephone in his family home in Hodeida was still
disconnected on August 31.
Muhammad Ghalib al-Khulaifi, a primary school teacher and YSP member, was imprisoned in solitary
confinement by military police at the beginning of the war on charges of “storing weapons,” although he said a latenight
search of his home at the time of his arrest produced no evidence to support this charge. When he was
released in early June, he discovered that his son also had been detained.
The Minister of Interior, Yahya al-Mutawakkil, said that many were given arms by the separatists.
According to al-Mutawakkil, the authorities detained those who possessed “weapons stockpiles.”114 Yemeni citizens

‘Abd al-Rahman Sallam and Shaqib ‘Abd al-Hayya al-Mujahid (press workers).
107See Amnesty International, “Human rights concerns following recent armed conflict,” p. 9.
108They included Yahya Mujahid al-Quhali (a sick, elderly
man), Muhammad Yahya Mujahid al-Quhali, Kamal Yahya al-Quhali (student), Amin Yahya Jahazar, Hussain Salih Jahazar, ‘Abd al-
Wasit ‘Abdallah al-Quhali, Ahmad Ahmar al-’Amar, Naji Mansur al-Quhali, and Yahya Nasr al-Quhali (student).
109Probably in Dar al-Bashari prison, headed by ‘Ali al-Sayyani.
110The exception to the incommunicado detention was a twenty-five-year-old man taken from YSP headquarters, Jamal ‘Abd al-
Rahman Sallam, whose parents discovered his whereabouts from a soldier. On their third visit they said their son appeared to
be “paralyzed” or at least immobilized, and his panic-stricken parents began visiting any Yemeni or foreign institution with the
potential to help him. Interview, Sana’a, Yemen, July 27, 1994.
111Telephone interview with Muhajid al-Quhali, August 27, 1994.
112The paper belonged to the Federation of Popular Forces party. At the height of the mud-slinging in early 1994, Sawt al-Ommal
and two Socialist organs published a list of the thirty-three top officers in Salih’s army, all from his own tribe, Sinhan, under the
title “Yemen’s new royal family.” The GPC’s 22 May retaliated with names of southern officers from the districts of Radfan and
Dala’. Then al-Shoura printed both lists side by side, on March 6, 1994, p.9.
113He had been tortured in security detention in the north in 1982 and said his treatment this time was much better.
114Interview, Aden, Yemen, July 20, 1994. His deputy in Aden, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Shahadi, explained that they eventually hope to

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 25 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
fully exercise a right to bear arms: Yemeni politicians throughout the country customarily are accompanied by five
or six armed guards each. Men often carry AK-47 Kalishnikov semi-automatic rifles at all times, except in Aden.
Torture and ill treatment were committed by both sides during this conflict, according to Amnesty
International. For instance, captured military personnel were said to have been tortured to force them to reveal
military information. One such victim, Col. Muhammad Saleh al-Najjar, was said to have vomited blood and
suffered acute kidney pains after being tortured by government Political Security forces in Ta’iz. Civilians also
suffered abuse: Yahya Ahmed Ahmed al-Jahari, a YSP member, was arrested at his job in Sana’a during June 1994.
He was detained in an underground cell, beaten, and kept in shackles for eighteen days.115 Despite protests that
shackling violates U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,116 Yemen authorities admit that
they still engage in this practice.117
In conclusion, the government violated due process and physical integrity rights of detainees throughout the
conflict.
DETENTIONS BY SEPARATIST FORCES
At least several hundred civilians were arrested and held in detention by the separatists in Aden during the
war, without charges against them or access to families or legal counsel. Those considered more important were
transferred to Mukalla Prison. ICRC delegates visited 161 detainees in Mukalla and Sayun in early July, thirty-four
of whom had been seen earlier in Aden.118 Captured combatants were also held: government sources said 762
members of their Central Security (amn al-Markasi) were detained after their early military defeat in Aden,
transferred to a prison camp in Mukalla, and released when Mukalla fell.119 According to an eyewitness, the
separatists held some 1,300 to 1,400 northerners, mostly common laborers, in army camps in and around Mukalla by
the end of the war.120
Scores of suspected Islamist activists had already been arrested in the south during 1993 and 1994 and
remained in detention. Some were accused of assassinations or attempted assassinations of socialists, their political
allies, and their families.121
Because a separatist movement is not yet a state, it cannot ratify and is not bound by the ICCPR. The
southern separatists are required as a Yemeni rebel force to comply with Protocol II’s provisions forbidding

implement a gun-registration policy modeled on American laws: those who do not come forth will be charged with possessing
unregistered weapons. These are ambitious plans, in light of custom.
115Amnesty International, “Yemen: Human rights concerns following recent armed conflict,” pp. 6-7.
116Rule 33. “Instruments of restraint such as handcuffs, chains, irons and strait-jackets, shall never be applied as a punishment.
Furthermore, chains or irons shall not be used as restraints.”
117Interview, Minister ‘Abd al-Karim al-Iriyani, Sana’a, Yemen, July 18, 1994.
118ICRC, “Update No. 4 on ICRC Activities in Yemen” (Geneva: July 7, 1994).
119Interview, Colonel al-Radhi, Tariq camp, Aden, Yeman, July 20, 1994.
120Phone interview, August 26, 1994, with a person who left Mukalla just before government forces re-gained control of the city
and wishes to remain anonymous.
121The YSP claimed that there were 150 political assassinations or attempted assassinations of its members, allies and their
families since unity, and that the government failed to investigate these cases. The YSP did not document or even list 150 cases.
The government investigated ten cases, including attacks on GPC officials. Some attacks which are a matter of public notice
(including attacks on the relatives of the Vice President) were not investigated.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 26 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
mistreatment of prisoners (Article 4 (2)) and requiring due process during any trial (Article 6).122
Some forty Somalis were arrested by the southern separatist authorities early in the war in Aden. As with
the other detainees, no charges were brought against them. They were released from the notorious al-Fatih security
prison after about forty days, after the intervention of the Somali Consul in Aden, and warned that next time they
would be charged, sentenced, and perhaps executed. It appeared they were suspected of sympathy to unity and/or to
radical Islamist movements. One Somali detainee reportedly was transferred to Mukalla Prison.
One Somali said he was taken from his home on June 27 and brought to al-Fatih security prison in Aden
where he was incarcerated with about 700 other men (mostly Yemenis) in one large cell. Soldiers on guard warned
them not to converse among themselves. About 425 prisoners were moved from the cell, some to Mukalla. Others
were arrested and there were no less than 400 in one cell.
The cell had neither running water nor a toilet, but detainees were permitted to wash for prayer and pray in a
courtyard. They were not permitted any personal visitors.
From their appearance and behavior, the Somali detainee guessed that about 250 of the 400 Yemeni
prisoners were civilian members of Islah, and the remainder Socialists.123 Officers and soldiers from the al-
’Amalaqah and Second Armored brigades, military police, and Republican Guard also were detained.124
Sources in Sana’a claimed that their forces released as many as 17,000 prisoners in Aden and Mukalla after
the war. Although this number seems exaggerated, it appears that in the confusion following the defeat of separatist
forces, all prisoners in the south–political detainees, captured combatants, and common criminals–were released or
escaped.125
PRESS FREEDOM AND THE POSTWAR DETENTION OF JOURNALISTS AND SCHOLARS
Freedom of the press was severely tested in 1992 when at least twelve newspapers and various journalists
were tried for various violations of the press law, including quoting the president from unofficial sources. Some
cases were dismissed, some resulted in acquittals, and some were never resolved.
During the war, most of the two dozen Arabic language newspapers regularly on the newsstands closed
down;126 some were published on printing presses, such as the YSP press, which were looted and/or destroyed early

122Had the Yemeni government properly derogated from its due process obligations under the ICCPR, it would still have been
subjected to the less defined standards of Protocol II; the Protocol, however, is silent on the protection against arbitrary arrest.
123He concluded that those who prayed regularly were mostly Islah and those who “put their heads in their hands and wept
secretly” were socialists. None were in military uniform.
124As a symbolic gesture of condemnation of the torture that had occurred in al-Fatih prison under the YSP, Presidential Council
President Ali Abdallah Salih drove a demolition vehicle through the cells and announced that the prison would be converted into
a public garden and playground. “Demolishes ‘Torture’ Prison,” Sana’a Yemeni Republic Radio Network in Arabic, August 3, 1994,
translated in FBIS-NES-94-150 (August 4, 1994), p. 22.
125The prison guards at Mansoura Prison near Aden, which before the conflict housed from 200-400 prisoners and pre-trial
detainees, said that the prison was shelled once during the fighting. When the government forces entered, they detained the
prison director at a checkpoint. The prison guards were afraid they would all be arrested so they decided to go into hiding in
Aden. Before they left, however, they released the prisoners rather than leave them locked up with no food or water — the water
to Aden still being cut. Interview, Mansoura Prison, Aden, Yemen, July 25, 1994.
126These included al-Ayyam, Sawt al-Ommal, al-Raay, al-Haq, al-Shoura, al-Tashih, al-Tajamma’. Some of these were formerly
printed on the YSP press, and others closed after offices were looted or editors arrested.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 27 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
in the conflict. After the war was over, several of the newspapers that were not aligned with the governing General
People’s Congress or its ally the Islah Party opened up under new, government-appointed editors who were stalwarts
of the GPC or Islah.127
The arrest without charges of at least fifteen journalists and other professionals in Sana’a on July 17 was
another ominous post-war development. The government nevertheless continued to claim there was “freedom of the
press.”128 These men were beaten up, accused of being against the government, and refused access to family and
legal counsel before being released from two to six days after their detention. No charges were ever brought against
them. At the time of the arrests Yemen was then being visited by delegations from two international human rights
groups, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
Some independent newspapers nevertheless struggled to stay in print. The al-Ayyam paper, owned by a
socialist, published twice after the war but was harshly criticized by the official and GPC papers. Al-Shoura, the
organ of the Confederation of Popular Forces party, critical of both leaderships in the pre-war period, produced a
few issues. The Yemen Times continued to print. But by October the government instructed all the printing presses
still printing (Arabic-language newspaper) to cease doing so, and these independent voices were silenced. In October
the government, through the press prosecutor’s office, commenced criminal proceeding in Sana’a under the Press
Law against al-Shoura and its editors.
This censorship of the opposition press was foreshadowed by the July 17 crackdown on over fifteen
journalists and others. Those arrested had participated in a seminar sponsored by the English-language independent
weekly paper Yemen Times at the Sheraton Hotel in Sana’a on July 14, 1994. The paper’s editor and organizer of the
seminar, Dr. ’Abd al-’Aziz al-Saqqaf, an economist, had been briefly detained early in the war for publishing
allegedly inflated casualty figures. He subsequently praised the restoration of unity in the Yemen Times. He invited
journalists from all three major parties and a number of smaller parties, plus a few independents, as was often the
practice in pre-war Yemen, to present papers on the “The Future of Yemen,” at the July 14 seminar. After agreeing
to participate, the GPC and Islah presenters did not attend, but the audience included other members of the press,
Gulf diplomats, foreign researchers, and Yemeni scholars.
Formal presentations of papers were followed by a lively discussion. A Gulf diplomat who attended said he
heard “nothing mildly treasonous” and “a lot of generalities.”
On July 17, over fifteen seminar participants were taken into custody for up to six days. Professor al-Saqqaf
and Ahmad al-Saufi were taken from their homes late at night, held in solitary confinement, handcuffed, beaten,
kicked, and bruised, and released the next evening. Al-Saufi, a well-known Socialist journalist, worked at the Prime
Minister’s office, was recording secretary to the Dialogue Committee, is a member of the Writers’ Guild and the
journalist syndicate, and has published a book on political violence in Yemen.
Others arrested in their homes included al-Shoura editor ’Abdallah Sa’ad and Ezzidin Said of the Writers’
Guild, the Sana’a Amnesty International group, and al-Jumhuriyya newspaper of Taiz. Two others who were
captured on the street in daytime were Numan Qaid Saif, editor of al-Watan magazine and contributor to the
newspaper of the Tajamma’ party, and Abd al-Rahman Saif of the YSP paper al-Mustaqbal and the staff of the
Ministry of Local Administration.
Dr. Muhammad al-Mikhlafi, a pro-unity northern socialist researcher at the Yemen Center for Research and
Studies, was “kidnapped,” he said, by men in civilian clothes while leaving his office to buy a cold drink. Trained as
an attorney, he asked for a warrant of arrest but was given none. He was confined, like his colleagues, in a one and
a half by two meter solitary cell underground in the Political Security complex on Jibuti Street, where he was fed

127Most notably, the former YSP-edited daily, 14 October, began publishing after the war under a newly appointed government
editor.
12826 September, July 28, 1994, p. 1 and p. 7, where “freedom of the press” is balanced against “responsibility of the press.”

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 28 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
“prison bread” (quddam), water, and some grease. He was the last released, at 9:30 P.M. on July 22, blindfolded.
The Ministry of Interior initially denied to his wife that al-Mikhlafi was being held, but on the third day of his
disappearance she received a confirmation of his detention from the President’s Office.129
The security forces appear to be continuing operations independently of the rest of the criminal justice
system. These arrests prompted condemnation from Judge Hamud al-Hitar a member of the GPC who denounced
them in interviews with Voice of America and Human Rights Watch. Attorney General Muhammad al-Badri, who
said he had no prior notice of the arrests, assured Human Rights Watch that with the end of the State of Emergency
such extra-judicial detention would be absolutely prohibited.130 Supreme Court Chief Justice Muhammad al-Hajji,
also disclaiming prior knowledge of the seminar arrests, stated unequivocally that there were and would be no
special courts and all detainees would be brought to trial under the constitution and the law.131
A week after Al-Saqqaf published a first-person account of his detention on the front page of the Yemen
Times, security officers again raided, but did not close, his offices.132 Unlike the Yemen Times, most other
independent, small party, and socialist newspapers had stopped publishing. Several lost their print facilities after
destruction of the YSP presses in Sana’a May 5 and in Aden around July 10,133 but others were discouraged by the
arrest of the al-Shoura reporter in May, the fire-bombing of the Aden offices of Sawt al-Ommal in late June, and
other forms of intimidation.134
Several faculty members, journalists, and writers interviewed said they felt the need to exercise selfcensorship
because some who have conspicuously abstained from praising the government but have taken no other
action, have been labeled “secessionists.”135 Homes and individuals have been placed under surveillance. Phone
lines are selectively cut.
DETENTIONS BY ARMED MILITIAS
Several people suggested that armed militia belonging to the Islah party had stepped into the vacuum of
authority in post-war Aden and other places in south Yemen, having occupied police stations and begun to perform
police functions according to their own vision of what the law should be.
Omar al-Jawi, a leader of the independent Al-Tajammu’ Party in Aden, and member of the Organization for
the Defense of Democratic Rights and Liberties, was among many in Aden who watched Islah members take over
Aden police stations in the early days after the government’s victory. Salem Muralaz, a teacher and Islah party leader
in Aden, among others, donned a uniform and ejected the few regular police still in the Crater police station after

129Interview, Sana’a, Yemen, July 27, 1994.
130Interview, Sana’a, Yemen, July 28, 1994. The State of Emergency ended the day before this interview.
131Interview, Sana’a, Yemen, July 27, 1994.
132Several Yemeni observers suggested that the English language Yemen Times, read by the ex-patriate and diplomatic
community, is tolerated — just barely — because it gives foreigners the illusion that freedom of the press continues; the Yemen
Times of course is inaccessible to the general public.
133Several papers too small to own their own presses used the YSP press; the GPC/government presses also printed some
independent papers.
134Asked why they halted production, four publishers, interviewed separately, all gave the same response: “Do you really think
we can publish in this atmosphere?” On cases brought by the Press Prosecutor under the 1990 Press Law before the war, see
Sheila Carapico, “Freedom of the Press in Yemen,” Yemen Times, October 24, 1993.
135All requested anonymity.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 29 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
removing their weapons.136 Amnesty International received reports that this militia held detainees in secret places of
detention.137 Yemen has a long history of “private jails,” primarily run under loose tribal authority; none of these
private jails are legal but the central state authorities have not had total success in their attempts to monopolize the
function of incarceration. The Hashid shaykh, al-Ahmar, who is also head of the Islah Party, has long had private
prisons in the north.
Yemen’s prison system has been the focus of intense public debate since unity, with press and human rights
organizations’ exposes of ill treatment leading to public demands for reform.
The tendency noted after the war, however, of additional private parties such as the Islah militia exercising
police and jail functions is a step backward for the police as well as the prison system.
As of August, apparently no measures have been taken by the government to stop these activities and
prevent nongovernment groups from exercising functions which are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the police.138
DEATH PENALTY
On July 29, 1994, five convicted criminals were executed after their death sentences were confirmed by the
Presidential Council, the ultimate appellate authority in such cases. At the same time it confirmed the death
sentences of another nine men.
All fourteen had been convicted of common crimes in the YAR before unity in the 1980s. At the time of
these convictions, the use of false testimony and statements extracted under torture was a widespread practice and
therefore there was a likelihood of miscarriage of justice in these cases,139 especially since the death penalty is an
irreversible punishment. There are perhaps 1,000 other persons who were condemned to death in the YAR during
the same period, whose punishment awaits confirmation by Salih.
Among those under death sentence is Mansur Rajih, a NDF member convicted of murder140 believed by
Amnesty International to be a prisoner of conscience detained solely for the non-violent expression of his political
beliefs.141
A group of over sixty NDF members were detained during the 1980s; many were convicted after trials in
which they were denied access to legal counsel either during pre-trial detention or during trial. Even when counsel
was available to some, the defendants were denied the right to call witnesses on their behalf or to cross examine
prosecution witnesses. Many were convicted based solely on “confessions” extracted under torture or duress. Some

136Salem Muralaz was personally known to Omar al-Jawi; Morales had been arrested by the Aden separatist authorities during
the war. Al-Jawi intervened on behalf of him and others and they were released from jail. Interview, Aden, Yemen, July 19, 1994.
137Amnesty International, “Human rights concerns following recent armed conflict,” p. 6.
138Ibid.
139Ibid., pp. 12-13. Judge Hammud al-Hitar of the Criminal Court and Judge Naguib Shamiry of the Supreme Court discussed the
absence of a criminal code (there is a 1979 draft that reflects customary law) and exceptions in the application of the criminal
procedures law with Ms. Carapico on several occasions.
140According to attorney Ahmad al-Wada’i and Judge Naguib Shamiry, both familiar with the case, interviewed in Sana’a, August
1993.
141Amnesty International, “Yemen: Unlawful detention and unfair trials of members of the former National Democratic Front,” AI
Index: MDE 31/04/93 (London: August 26, 1993).

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 30 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
who were in custody were nevertheless tried without appearing before a court, including at least five detainees who
were sentenced to death in their absence.142 Their detention continued despite an amnesty given by the President to
those accused of collaboration with the NDF uprising on January 30, 1982.
The death penalty is legal under Yemeni law, but these 1994 executions represent a continued acceleration
of the rate of execution. Distinguished members of the Yemeni Supreme Court, moreover, have argued that since the
prisoners have served long prison sentences, execution represents two punishments for the same crime, which is
illegal. There were five reported executions in 1992 and over thirty in 1993, one of whom was a boy age thirteen.143
The execution of a minor is a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Yemen ratified in
1991.144
GENERAL AMNESTY
A General Amnesty was announced in Yemen on May 23145 and at the United Nations after the end of the
war. Sixteen separatist leaders, including former Vice President ’Ali Salim al-Bayd, and vice-president of the
declared breakaway government ’Abd al-Rahman al-Jiffri, did not receive amnesty and are wanted for treason or war
crimes. These persons’ homes and other property within the country reportedly have been confiscated. They, as
well as many other prominent Socialists, Bakilis, and independents (including members of the National Dialogue
Committee), remain abroad.
The government announced that the amnesty expired on August 15, 1994, and that 9,000 persons had
returned to the country and accepted the amnesty. The government said in addition that the amnesty covered even
those who committed acts constituting war crimes, such as firing Scuds.146 Human Rights Watch opposes this
construction of the amnesty and urges the government to try, according to due process, those combatants believed to
have committed serious violations of the rules of war.
President of the Presidential Council, General ’Ali Abdallah Salih, warned rank-and-file socialists inside the
country that their behavior would be “watched” to be sure that they are “loyal” to the cause of unity.147

142Ibid., pp. 5-6.
143Amnesty International, “Human rights concerns following recent armed conflict,” p. 13.
144Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37: States Parties shall ensure that “(a) . . . Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offenses committed by persons below 18 years of age . . . .”
Yemen’s report under this Convention is overdue; it was due on May 30, 1993.
145The amnesty provides, in part:
Article 1: With the exception of the secessionist elements whose names are given in the arrest warrant issued by the
public prosecutor of the republic on 23 May, a general amnesty shall be granted to all the civilian and military men
who, under the hegemony of the criminal secessionist clique, acted or behaved in a manner conflicting with the
Constitution and punishable under the law. According to this decree, they will enjoy their full political and civilian
rights and will continue to assume their responsibilities in the various places of work and production under
commitment to constitutional legitimacy.
Article 2: Everyone who abides by the constitutional legitimacy shall benefit from this amnesty.

“Salih Issues Decree Granting General Amnesty,” Sanaa Yemeni Republic Radio Network in Arabic, May 24, 1994, translated in
FBIS-NESA-94-100 (May 24, 1994), pp. 31-32.
14611Assem Abdel-Mohsen, “Yemen Amnesty Ends After Bringing Back 9,000,” Reuters, Sana’a, Yemen, August 15, 1994.
147Quoted in al-Hayat (London), August 8, 1994.

Human Rights Watch/Middle East 31 October 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1
RECOMMENDATIONS
HRW/Middle East recommends that the government of Yemen
$ lift restrictions on the press, cease arrests of journalists and editors and raids of their offices unless they are
charged with a recognizable criminal offense and promptly tried in accordance with internationally recognized
standards for fair trials.
$ promptly release all prisoners of conscience, that is, those arrested for their ideas or expression of opinion.
$ guarantee free exercise of the political and civil rights of all who were away from the country during the conflict
upon their return.
$ release, unless they are to be charged with a recognizable criminal offense and promptly tried in accordance with
internationally recognized standards for fair trials, all political detainees.
$ in view of the fact that government compensation has already been given to some, compensate, without
discrimination on account of their residence or loyalties during the war, civilians injured in the conflict and the
families of all civilian war dead, and those who have lost homes, jobs, businesses, livestock, or goods as a result of
military activities during the conflict.
$ release all those detained in connection with the conflict, pursuant to the General Amnesty of May 23, 1994,
except those believed to have committed serious violations of the rules of war. In such cases, charge and try them
promptly in accordance with internationally recognized standards for fair trials.
$ bring to justice all members of the armed forces and any militias found to have committed human rights violations
and violations of the r

Mr.president why cant we all the same. We don’t mind if you have lot of money but you should also let us have money and live like you.

Mr.President, I am yemeni just like you, you used to be very poor when you were 16 and you quit school and went to the army so you can support your self and your mother. Why didn’t you make other citzens who are like you when you used to be poor. Mr.president, i don’t want to kick you out or go on revloution against you, but i want to live. I want to go back to my country and live like everyone else in the world.

Mr.president i wish you read this message, i wish you can regeret the people who died because of hunger, and poor days. Remember each person in yemen should be treated like you want your son Ahmed to be treated. May god protect us all.

Comes at the head of the family tree the eldest son of Salih, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, Commander of the Republican Guard and Special Forces; and son brother Salih, Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, Commander of the Central Security Forces; and the son of the brother of Saleh, Tariq Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, commander of the presidential guard.

Includes family tree is also the son of the brother of Saleh, Ammar Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, assistant director of national security; and the son of the brother-brother, Mohammed Saleh, commander of the Air Force; and half-brother, Ali Mohsen Saleh, commander of the First Brigade and the commander of the region north and west in the army; and brother brother, Ali Saleh, Director of the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Remain in power for as long as the members of his family. This means that there is no real change Hadi’s weakness, among several other factors, has tainted the excitement over Saleh’s signing the agreement with . Because the regime remains largely intact, with Saleh safely sheltered in his palace and his sons and nephews still occupying the upper echelons of the military and intelligence services. ., — despite widespread corruption allegations and hundreds of protesters shot dead in recent months by government troops
There is the very real possibility that Saleh will have to stand trial in a Yemeni court for all of his crimes against his people and his own nation that he committed during his 30 year reign of terror and corruption as President of Yemen We as citizens of south do not believe that we as a nation should provide a safe haven for a man who has ordered the murder and torture of his own citizens, who had journalists arrested, tortured and imprisoned because they reported on the crimes and corruptions of his regime
Saleh has been using Al-Qaeda terrorists , and providing support and protection for them when such use helped him to achieve his own agenda And to all the Yemenis who helped to bring Saleh down. Job well done! You have had numerous enemies who tried to stop you from removing Saleh from power, and bringing positive change to Yemen. who downplayed our south country occupation by north forces who kill southern people every day
fears that President Saleh of Yemen would attempt to gain as President of his corrupt regime. . . to remove him from power. We believe as many others do that Saleh is only trying to save his own life and the millions of dollar that he stole from his own people from south oil and land we ask international community and all friends in U.S.A and UNITED NATION to help south to get back their state and get their self determination who suffer since 1994 war all bad treatment by occupation forces
Lt. COMMANDER MOHAMMED ABDULLAH MUTHANNA TAHER

She said: “These forces and targeted artificial and there is a security benefit from the status quo and the state of insecurity in some southern areas and others.

The Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs in a press statement of the number of media on the sidelines of the launch of the Voice of the development of the first events that: “Al-Qaeda in Yemen, a part of the previous show at the time what you want and hide what time you want to achieve political gains, and accused the previous government,” the launch of release of prisoners from the organization to perform some acts of terrorism against the people and political forces. ”

The minister said: “The al Qaeda members used the war in the summer of 1994 and the liquidation of the leaders of socialist and South during that period.” At the same time confirming that al-Qaeda creature par excellence of the former regime and that they should stop their hands from the people.

She added: “If interested citizens came together and united all the forces of good to save the world will end this matter,” which he said “is just raised to avenge the remnants of power.”

On the possible participation of supporters of sharia law in the national dialogue conference, the minister explained that the right to ask what they have without resorting to violence and unite themselves in the context of a political bloc.

The group called on supporters of the law to not impose their views on others by force, and said that: “Islam is a religion of tolerance and good and tender and not a religion of murder and terrorism and amputations.”

She noted that there are those who want to distort this stage and make more trouble for the issue of the peaceful transfer of power. Pointing out that some of the marches and disturbances, the process by the authorities and political forces, and said that “everyone should be aware of that and the threat to the nation and work to make the interests of the country Massalhm personal.”

She called all the independents to participate in the national dialogue and to organize an entity to provide elite represented at the conference, noting that they reach to the millions of independent and that they present themselves through entities or coalitions