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Yemen Spirals Toward Disintegration Long War Journal

As war renews in Yemen’s North and protests turn to riots in the South, terror attacks have hit the capital, and the opposition is boycotting upcoming elections. Civil liberties are under attack and traditionalism growing as the central government turns to hard liners for support and the population’s basic needs go unmet.

Northern war

Despite a recent $1.4 million donation from the UK, the World Food Programme is facing an urgent shortage of funds to feed the 77,000 civilians displaced by the war in north Yemen. Several thousand have been killed in the war that began in 2004 and thousands of homes, mosques, and businesses have been destroyed by government shelling. A cease-fire agreement inked in June 2007 failed to stop the fighting and was renegotiated in January. Qatari mediators withdrew this week as both the Yemeni military and the northern Zaidi Shiite rebels refuse to abandon their positions as required. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 200 families arrived in Sa’ada City over the last week because of renewed fighting.

Southern protests

Large protests continue in southern Yemen and have become more frequent and heated. About 200 people are detained without charge in connection with the week-long riots in early April. The protests began last year as demands for equal rights and morphed into calls for southern secession from the state that unified in 1990. Twenty demonstrators have been killed since August. Flags of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen are openly flown at the protests, unthinkable a year ago. Six university students were arrested on Monday. The regime accuses both the domestic opposition and expatriate Yemenis of instigating the protests that currently focus on the release of political prisoners.

Opposition boycott

A new prohibition against demonstrations is an undeclared state of emergency, the opposition charged. The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) is an opposition coalition of the Islamic Reform party known as Islah, the Yemeni Socialist Party, and some smaller parties. The JMP announced it will boycott gubernatorial elections in May, calling them a facade of democracy. Governors will be elected by local councils that are dominated by President Saleh’s ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC). Parliamentary elections are slated for 2009. The opposition JMP is rejecting a draft law designating that the Supreme Electoral Commission will be composed of judges. The judiciary in Yemen is highly subject to executive influence. This stalemate may result in an opposition boycott of the parliamentary elections as well.

Terror attacks

Three explosive devices were detonated near the exterior wall of the main police center in the eastern province of Hadramout late Tuesday evening. No one was wounded. It is the 10th incident of a small attack on government targets — police stations, government buildings, and checkpoints — outside the capital since mid-March. Six soldiers were killed in four of the attacks, many of which took place at night. Both the US and UN withdrew nonessential personnel in the last weeks after a mortar attack targeting the US embassy killed one Yemeni policeman in March. In April a western residential compound was subject to mortar fire. No one was injured. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility in an Internet posting for the mortar attacks and an earlier attack on a checkpoint in Hadramout.

The Yemeni regime announced this week that it arrested a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Mohammed Yaqout, in connection with the attack on the US embassy. Senior al Qaeda terrorist Abduallah al Reimi was reportedly arrested on April 7, but it was later found to be a case of mistaken identity. Reimi is wanted in connection with the 2003 al Qaeda attack in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that killed 17 and wounded 120.

US-Yemeni relations strained

FBI Director Robert Mueller visited Yemen on April 10 to discuss counterterror cooperation between the US and Yemen. Mueller repeated the US request for the extradition of Jamal al Badawi, convicted in the attack on the USS Cole, who escaped jail twice and surrendered in October 2007 to Yemeni officials. Badawi was later reported by local media to be living at home, although government officials claimed he was only visiting and is currently incarcerated. Seventeen US sailors were killed and 49 wounded in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 in the port of Aden. After Mueller’s visit, a planned trip to the US by Yemen’s foreign minister Abu Bakr al Qirby was abruptly postponed. Badawi is one of the FBI’s most wanted terrorists, as is Yemeni-American Jaber Elbaneh.

Yemen also refuses to extradite Elbaneh to the US, citing a constitutional prohibition. Elbaneh attended the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan along with six of his friends from Lackawanna, New York. The Lackawanna Six all pleaded guilty to terror related charges after their return to the US. Elbaneh never returned to the US and escaped Yemeni jail in February 2006 along with Badawi and 21 al Qaeda operatives. Elbaneh surrendered May 2007. In November 2007 Elbaneh was sentenced in absentia to 10 years in jail for a terror attack. Elbaneh is free on bail and attended two appeal hearings this month. Elbaneh claimed to the court that he reached an agreement directly with Yemeni president Saleh and the matter is finished.

Civil liberties diminished

The trial of prominent activist and journalist Abdulkairm al Khaiwani continues to infuriate Yemeni civil society, fellow journalists, and rights organizations. Al Khaiwani is charged with terrorism and faces the death penalty for possessing information and photographs of the war in Sa’ada. (The Yemeni government calls the Sa’ada rebels “terrorists” although the war is a domestic rebellion and the rebels do not target civilians.) After a lengthy trial, a verdict is expected in May.

A leading independent weekly al Wasat was abruptly closed in April. In a statement, the paper’s staff noted, “While the country is facing a total collapse, the regime is sparing no chance to shutdown all means of expression and clamp on all free voices in the country.” Since the outbreak of the Sa’ada war in 2004, and again with the growing protests in southern Yemen, the Yemeni government increasingly restricted and targeted the media and free expression. A slew of physical and judicial attacks on journalists and newspapers occurred with regularity. The government also blocked opposition and independent news Web sites and blogs. The Internet news aggregator YemenPortal.net changed domain names several times and devised several tactics to circumvent the censorship including an RSS feed and a downloadable Firefox extension.

Growing traditionalism

In April, the GPC-dominated Parliament refused to vote on a proposed bill outlawing female genital mutilation and another prohibiting the marriage of girls under 15. Underage marriage is common in Yemen with half of all women married before their 18th birthday and many bearing a child shortly after their first menstrual period. Population growth is among the highest in the region, straining the economy. Eight-year-old Nojoud Muhammed Nasser went to court last week requesting a divorce from her 30-year-old husband who forced her to have sex with him when she preferred to play in the yard, she said. After an anonymous donor provided funds to repay her dowry, the marriage was dissolved. The regime is increasingly relying on the support of religious hardliners in response to pressures from northern Shiite rebels, southern Socialists, and civil activists across the country. The government deploys takfiri terminology in state mosques and the official media, excommunicating political rivals and according to some, legitimizing their deaths.

The Yemeni government is in part a criminalized regime, with drug and weapons smuggling and child trafficking accomplished with the coordination of people affiliated with the administration. The government is highly corrupt, with the proceeds of oil revenues, donor grants, and loans subject to elite capture. The regime does make public reform efforts in response to domestic and international pressure, but these are often superficial and accompanied by an equal amount of regression in practice. Rising food prices have erased years of small gains against poverty, and 46 percent of Yemenis now live on under $2.00 a day. Public services including water, education, electricity, security, and medical facilities are largely unavailable in rural Yemen, where 70 percent of the population resides, strengthening public reliance on tribal affiliation for survival.

Yemenat.net

القاعدة في اليمن مرتزقة أم إرهابيون؟

[23/4/2008] ? : - جين نوفاك*- ترجمة خاصة بـ[يمنات]

لقد تم الإعلان عن تناقض وجهات النظر بين محللين سياسيين غربيين ويمنيين حول اندلاع الهجمات الإرهابية في اليمن حيث بينت إحدى المقالات في مركز مكافحة الإرهاب أنه«تم التغلب على القاعدة في اليمن بسبب التعاون الوثيق بين اليمن والولايات المتحدة أثناء المرحلة الأولى من الحرب (2000 - 2003) لكنها - القاعدة - تعلمت من هذه الخسارة»وكيفت تكتيكاتها وأهدافها.
الجيل الجديد من هذا التنظيم يرفض التفاوض مع نظام الحكم اليمني وتبشر به إستراتيجية جديدة ورقي مستمر،عبر الدعاية الخاصة بالشبكة العنكبوتية.

في الوقت الذي تستحوذ فيه الضغوطات الداخلية على اهتمام نظام الحكم اليمني، تأتي فيه السيطرة على هذا التنظيم في آخر الأولويات.

إن استقرار اليمن ونظام حكم الرئيس اليمني هو الخطوة الأولى المهمة للتغلب على نظام القاعدة، وهذا ما يؤكده المقال المشار إليه،وعلى الولايات المتحدة أن تضخ المزيد من الأموال تحقيقاً لهذا الهدف. وقد بين الكاتب أنه على الولايات المتحدة أن ترتب مطالبها من اليمن حسب الأولوية ثم تقرر ما إذا كانت تريد شريكاً في الحرب على القاعدة أو ما إذا كانت تريد دولة تحاول أن تلبي معايير الديمقراطية.

يشارك في هذا التقييم العام محللون غربيون آخرون ممن يتفقون مع التأكيد بأن العاملين المتسترين في تنظيم القاعدة والذين عادوا من العراق، مسئولون عن تكرار الضربات في اليمن الهادفة إلى إضعاف نظام الحكم اليمني.

وتصف وحدة الرقابة الأمنية(أي اس إن) الهجمات بقولها «استهدفت إضعاف العائدات الحكومية مع الهجمات على منشآت نفطية وكذا الأنابيب وشركات النفط الأجنبية و السياح».

وبالمثل تجد مؤسسة جمس تاون الخاصة بالبؤر الإرهابية أن:«الهجمات جسدت رسالة إلى الرئيس صالح وإلى المجتمع الدولي مفادها أن استراتيجية تنظيم القاعدة في العراق استراتيجية إحداث الفوضى، يتم الآن نقلها إلى أوطان الجماعات المتطرفة».

يتواجد الرأي المعارض كثيراً بين أوساط المحللين السياسيين اليمنيين ويعتقد أن نظام الحكم في اليمن يرعى وينشر متطرفين إسلاميين بصفتهم مرتزقة ووسيلة سياسة خارجية.

وحيث إن هذه الرؤية تسود فيما بين أوساط المعارضة السياسية الداخلية في اليمن، إلا أنها غير محصورة عليهم، وبعضهم في الحكومة اليمنية يعبر عن هذه النظرة سرياً.

في هذا المثال تلاقي معظم الهجمات الإرهابية تخويلاً من شخصيات تنتسب إلى نظام الحكم بغرض تحقيق عديد أهداف من ضمنها إثارة الاستعطاف والتمويل الدوليين في حال تقليل مطالب المانحين للإصلاح والتعاون الفاعل في محاربة الإرهاب.

عبر عن هذه الرؤية منير الماوري عندما كتب في (يمن تايمز) قائلاً «ولكن الأمر الذي ظهر صدقه بالبرهان هو أن معظم العمليات الإرهابية في وطننا قام بها أشخاص أحالتهم السلطة من الشبكة الإرهابية لتنظيم القاعدة إلى معسكر إرهابي تسيطر عليه الحكومة، ولذا نجد أن معظم الإرهابيين المتواجدين في اليمن، يتلقون أوامر من مسئولين في الجيش اليمني ومؤسسات أمنية.

ويؤكد الماوري أن نظام الحكم يراعي زعم «القاعدة»،كما أنها تراعي ادعاء الديمقراطية وأن التنظيم الجديد للقاعدة في اليمن ألعوبة إبادية تشكلت إيفاءً بتوقعات غربية.

الاستاذ عبد الله الأصنج، وزير خارجية اليمن سابقا، شخصية محترمة رفيعة المستوى، علق قائلا:«لا أستطيع أن أتفق مع الماوري أكثر من هذا فعناصر الإرهاب لا تنتسب إلى تنظيم القاعدة، بل معظمها لها علاقة بأعمال يقال إن لها صلة بزعماء القبائل و الحزب السياسي الحاكم. ومما ترسخ دون أدنى شك أن نظام الحكم في اليمن بقيادة فخامة الرئيس علي عبد الله صالح وحكومته السلطوية قد صب الزيت على الحرب الأهلية الدائرة في الصومال من خلال الاتجار غير المشروع بالأسلحة مع الأطراف المتصارعة».

كما أشار الأصنج إلى استخدام مصادر الدولة في تسهيل أنشطة ارهابية واجرامية قائلاً«: تذهب مصادر حكومية بقدر ماهو مقترح أن مسؤولين حكوميين رفيعي المستوى يدعمون باستمرار عمليات تداول نقود غير قانونية وتزوير دولارات أمريكية وريالات سعودية.الأسلحة والمخدرات وتهريب الأطفال أحداث يومية تنبع من اليمن وتنتقل إلى دول مجاورة تحديداً المملكة السعودية، الإمارات العربية المتحدة وبقية دول الخليج وتدفق المتطوعون للانضمام الى طوائف حرب مختلفة حاملين جوازات سفر يمنية أمر واضح، فمنذُ أسابيع قليلة فقط قامت سلطات سورية بتسليم عدد من اليمنيين العابرين للحدود السورية من العراق بزعم ارتباطهم بإرهابيين في العراق، و مثل هكذا تسرب لعناصر تحمل جوازات سفر يمنية إلى العراق ومنها لا يمكن أن يتم دون موافقة المستبد اليمني واعوانه».

كما أوضح الأصنج أن الفساد والتواطؤ في اليمن يستمران حتى أعلى القيادة السياسية وقال : «لا يمكن الاعتماد على الرئيس اليمني شريكاً لاحلال الاستقرار في اليمن حتى في الفترة القصيرة،إن الدعم المالي والسياسي لن يعمل إلاّ على فتح شهيته على القيام بمزيد من الاعمال البشعة».

محلل سياسي يمني آخر معتد به وجد أن عدم الاستقرار السياسي الراهن في اليمن وسلسلة الهجمات الإرهابية، وثيقة الارتباط ببعضها لكن ليس بالصورة التي يفهمها الغرب عموماً.و يقول المحلل السياسي - طالباً عدم الكشف عن هويته :«الواضح من التطورات الأخيرة - سواء كانت اقتصادية أو أمنية - أن نظام الحكم مصاب بالمرض ويستخدم آخر بطاقات قليلة لديه ليظل في السلطة».

وأضاف المحلل«إن تشكيل ستار اعلامي كبير يعد واحدا من أنجح التكتيكات سواء كان هذا الإخفاء محلياً أو دولياً،و ذلك بغرض إخفاء الاتفاقات المشبوهة مع عناصر القاعدة والاحتجاجات الكبيرة وقتل المواطنين جنوب اليمن، لكن الحقيقة قادمة». وخلص إلى القول : «الحقيقة خلافاً لما يظن الكثيرون - أن أنهيار اليمن - دولة ونظاما - قريب ، فعلاً قريب،وذلك هو الواقع المرير الذي ينبغي التنبه إليه».

ويقول مسعد علي،مدير المركز اليمني الأمريكي لمكافحة الإرهاب، معلقاً على هذا المقال إن نظام الحكم اليمني مسؤول عن الهجمات الأخيرة مسؤولية جادة طالما وقد قًتل العديد من السياح الأجانب، ويقول إن الهجمات«نتيجة العلاقة الجيدة بين نظام الحكم وتنظيم القاعدة».

وتهدف الهجمات إلى«حمل الغرب عموماً والولايات المتحدة خصوصاً على الاعتقاد بأن اليمن حليف للولايات المتحدة ضد تنظيم القاعدة، لكن الواضح بالنسبة للشعب اليمني هو العلاقة القوية بين نظام الحكم والتنظيم».

وعلى هذا فإن مساعدة الولايات المتحدة لمواجهة الإرهاب والمتمثلة في التمويل والتدريب والإعداد قد تم استخدامها«ضد الشعب اليمني فقط» .

وتابع الاستاذ علي ساردا أسماء عدة أعضاء رفيعة المستوى ضمن ادارة الرئيس صالح،يقول عنهم الأستاذ علي بأنهم منتسبون للتنظيم ومسهلون له،من ضمن هذه الأعضاء قائد الفرقة الأولى مدرع علي محسن الأحمر،ورئيس جهاز الأمن السياسي غالب القمش،وقائدالأمن المركزي يحيى محمد عبد الله صالح،ورئيس جهازالأمن القومي علي الآنسي.

نقلا عن صحيفة اللونج وور

19 أبريل2008

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لقراءة النص الأصلي باللغة الانجليزية Long War Journal

Yemen’s Intifada

Al-Wasat, Yemen’s Intifada الأربعاء 09 يناير 2008

يواجه اليمن عدم استقرار غير مرئي منذ الحرب الأهلية في 1994م زادت من حدته الحرب التي خاضتها الدولة مع الثوار الشيعة

في محافظة صعدة الواقعة شمال اليمن، حيث خلفت تلك الحرب أكثر من 50000 لاجئ داخلي، ورغم أن التمرد انتهى في يونيو/ حزيران الماضي إلا أن التهديد ما زال قابلا للاشتعال بسبب عدم تطبيق أي من الطرفين لشروط وقف إطلاق النار.

التهميش السياسي والاقتصادي لقطاع واسع من المجتمع ساهم في التمرد وبالتالي خلق فسادا حكوميا مستوطنا.. قلة الخدمات الأساسية والتدابير الأمنية المتشددة كانت من أهم العوامل المحفزة لاحتجاجات جنوب اليمن واسعة الانتشار والتي جذبت أكثر من 100.000 محتج والتي راح ضحيتها حتى الآن عشرة محتجين زعم أن قوات الأمن هي من قتلتهم بالإضافة إلى ضرب واعتقال الكثير منهم.

الهيمنة ليست تكاملا:

الاضطراب في جنوب اليمن ترجع أسبابه إلى الهيمنة الشمالية التي أعقبت إعلان الوحدة في العام 1990م بين الشمال والجنوب.

الحزب الاشتراكي اليمني الذي حكم اليمن الجنوبية سابقا همش بعد حرب 1994م الأهلية (وهو ما انعكس على كل الجنوب..) الدكتور/ عيدروس نصر النقيب رئيس كتلة الحزب الاشتراكي اليمني البرلمانية قال “أشارت لجنة الحزب الاشتراكي المركزية إلى أن الجنوب اعتبر غنيمة حرب بكل أرضه وناسه وشركاته وثرواته.. كما لاحظ الحزب أيضا أن العنف الممارس ضد ا لمحتجين يعكس نوع السياسة الممارسة عليهم كنتيجة للحرب”.

لقد أحبط الفساد وحكم القلة الشمالي وسيطرة أقرباء الرئيس صالح علي الكثير من وحدات الجيش ومراكز الأمن المصالحة بين الشمال والجنوب.. كما أن التعديلات الدستورية المتعاقبة مركزت القوة في يد السلطة ما أدى إلى اندماج واقعي بين الحزب الحاكم والسلطة وكلاهما برئاسة صالح.

منذ مايو الماضي عمت الاحتجاجات كلا من عدن - الضالع- لحج- أبين- شبوة- حضرموت بدعوة وتنظيم من قبل الضباط العسكريين الجنوبيين السابقين الذين يقولون إنهم قوعدوا قسريا بعد حرب 94م الاهلية وإن رواتبهم أقل بكثير مما تتطلبه الحياة المعيشية ويصل عدد المتقاعدين الجنوبيين العسكريين والمدنيين إلى أكثر من مائة ألف متقاعد، وتتركز الشكاوى الجنوبية في النهب الواسع للأراضي العامة والسكنية والتجارية من قبل الشماليين الأقوياء بالإضافة إلى التمييز الرسمي في التوظيف وانتشار المعسكرات ونقاط التفتيش بشكل كبير في كل مناطق الجنوب.

اتساع مساحة السخط:

هذا الاضطراب المدني في الجنوب سبب احتجاجا ساخطا وتظاهرا عارما لآلاف المحتجين في تعز حملوا خلاله قناني الماء وأرغفة الخبز كدلالة على غلاء الأسعار المرتفع.

في مارب إحدى المحافظات النفطية خرج متظاهرون يطالبون بمنح المحافظة حقها من عائدات النفط ودرجات التوظيف.

في عمران - شمال العاصمة - طالب عشرة آلاف من رجال القبائل بضرورة إجراء إصلاحات حكومية في الوقت الذي كان فيه معلمون، أطباء، صيادلة، واتحادات عمال، شباب عاطلون، مرضى كلى، صحافيون يواصلون احتجاجاتهم في العاصمة صنعاء.

شكوى عامة تتركز كلها في ارتفاع الأسعار وازدياد نسبة الفقر حيث كانت أعلى نسبة تضخم في الفقر في العام 2006م حيث وصلت إلى أكثر من 20% بالإضافة إلى احتكار تخزين القمح الذي أسهم بارتفاع الأسعار إضافة إلى تعاظم سعره العالمي كما زادت أسعار كل من الزيوت واسطوانات الغاز والذي وصل سعره أحيانا إلى 1000 ريال بدلا عن 400.

فشل تطبيق استراتيجية الأجور 2005م كانت أيضا أحد أسباب السخط بالإضافة إلى انخفاض عائدات النفط والجرع السعرية المصحوبة بسيطرة الفساد وتقليل صرفيات الحكومة ومع هذا أضيف مبلغ 228 بليون إلى ميزانية 2007م رصدت لتثبيت الأسعار وكتكلفة لحرب ثورة الشمال وانخفاض أسعار النفط والراتب الإضافي الذي منحه الرئيس لموظفي الدولة خلال حملته الانتخابية.

الرئيس كرر وعوده بالقضاء على البطالة بالرغم من أن كثيرا من المواطنين اشتكوا من أنهم أقصوا من أعمالهم خاصة العسكرية من خلال التسريح.

قلة من المسئولين من قدمت ضدهم دعوى إساءة التصرف رغم أن الفساد نهب من الميزانية أكثر من نسبة 23%.

الرد المتوقع:

وعلى الرغم من السقف العالي لمطالب الإصلاح فإن رد نظام صالح عليها كان بإطلاق الشرطة (مكافحة الشغب) الذخيرة الحية والغاز المسيل للدموع وخراطيم المياه ضد المحتجين وتم اعتقال العشرات منهم وبضمنهم حسن باعوم عضو مركزية الحزب الاشتراكي والعميد ناصر النوبة رئيس جمعية المتقاعدين العسكريين بتهم الخيانة التي عقوبتها الموت وإثر جولة أخرى من الاحتجاجات تم إطلاق سراحهما .. كما أن عشرون قائدا سياسيا اعتقلوا إثر جولة أخرى من الاحتجاجات.

الوسائل الإعلامية الغير حكومية هي الأخرى واقعة تحت هجوم السلطة.. حيث يواجه الصحفي عبد الكريم الخيواني عقوبة الموت لنشره أخبارا عن حرب صعدة (أضعفت معنويات الجيش) كما منعت قوات الأمن مراسلي الجزيرة والعربية من تغطية الاحتجاجات الجنوبية وكذلك موقع أخبار الحزب الاشتراكي. بالمقابل يحاول الرئيس صالح وأجهزة إعلامه التأثير على شعور الناس عبر وعود الإصلاحات والتعويض إلا أنه وعلى أية حال فإن الثقة منعدمة.. ثمانية آلاف ضابط جنوبي أعيدوا إلى مواقعهم وقد ذكر العقيد ناصر صالح بأن أحد شروط تلك العودة كان القسم بعدم ممارسة النشاط السياسي.. واقترح صالح التعديلات الدستورية لتحسين الحكم المحلي.. في رمضان الفائت قلل صالح في خطاب له من حدوث أزمة لكن مستشاره ورئيس وزرائه السابق عبد القادر باجمال هدد بإبطال العمل بقانون منع السلاح وبتسليح الشارع الشمالي لمواجهة احتجاجات الجنوب. وعلى الرغم من وجود محاولات استقطاب إقليمي إلا أنه من المستبعد حدوث حرب أهلية رغم ازدياد السخط الشعبي ..على أية حال أحزاب المعارضة لم تؤسس.

اليمن في 2009م سيخوض انتخابا برلمانيا قد يوجد المواطنين في الرفض إذا كانت العملية غير عادلة كالانتخابات الرئاسية الأخيرة وإذا سيزداد عدم الاستقرار، وقد يتحرك قادة عسكريون لحماية مصالحهم من خلال الانقلاب.

*كاتبة امريكية - خاص بالوسط

Al-Qaeda in Yemen: Mercenaries or Terrorists

Yemenat.net

القاعدة في اليمن مرتزقة أم إرهابيون؟

[23/4/2008] ? : - جين نوفاك*- ترجمة خاصة بـ[يمنات]

نقلا عن صحيفة اللونج وور

19 أبريل2008

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لقراءة النص الأصلي باللغة الانجليزية Long War Journal

(Y44) Internet Censoship Yemen Times March 6, 2008

The Internet has taken root in Yemen, functioning as it does everywhere, as a social network, as an electronic pamphleteer and as a purveyor of facts and ideas. The Yemeni government is intimidated by the public’s internet use and the resulting social and political progress. Consequently the Yemeni state dramatically increased internet censorship in the last months, as it is prone to do in times of crisis and negative publicity.

The regime is blocking both information and political content from the Yemeni web user. Yemen’s Internet Service Providers (ISP) denied access to Youtube videos of southern protests by defining the videos as pornography. At the time of this writing, the government is censoring at least 17 internet news and opinion sites. Most proxy services are inaccessible as well. The government, which monopolizes the broadcast media, also controls the country’s internet.

A standard WHOIS query to the blocked domains shows the output is filtered. The government ISP automatically denies internet requests from Yemeni users by using Websense and Antlabs to filter internet content. Websense enables the government to block websites by category and to define specific internet sites to block. Although the regime blocks news websites, fanatical Jihaddist websites remain available to the public. Internet censorship is a wall that serves the regime by isolating the Yemeni people from information and from each other. It also isolates Yemen from the world.

Yemen has long positioned itself as a democratizing, reforming regime. The verbiage of democracy underpins Yemen’s domestic and international legitimacy. Since Yemeni unity in 1990, citizens internalized and Yemenized democratic values and goals. In years past, the international community saw Yemen’s free press as a demonstrable indication of its commitment to democratization. However internet censorship, an embargo on Yemen’s new media, is occurring in conjunction with a broad, sustained governmental campaign against the traditional media. Journalists, editors, critics and oppositionists have been arrested, beaten, defamed, fined, threatened and kidnapped in increasing numbers. With the Yemen government waging war against information itself, international praise has turned to criticism.

Internet censorship in Yemen is a symptom of the regime’s inability to reconcile with its opponents. The regime habitually attempts to co-opt, crush or de-legitimize its opposition. Some have postulated the regime is engaging tribal behavior; however in a tribal construct, each tribe recognizes the right of other tribes to exist and justice is a mutually recognized goal. The ruling regime in Yemen has yet to accept the legitimacy of popular inclusion in the form of an authentic opposition competing for power. The repetitive wars in the north and ongoing civil unrest in the south arise from the ruling elite’s inability to accept former foes as partners in the political process, to say nothing of fostering new competitors for power. Internet censorship is method of excluding the public voice from the political system and thwarting meaningful transfer of power. Other methods of exclusion include takfirism and authoritarianism.

Yemen suffers from a phenomenon known as State Capture where large portions of the state are controlled by private interest groups. Resources of the state flow through patronage networks. Corruption is the defining characteristic of the administrative and state culture. As Professor Robert Burrowes wrote recently in the Yemen Times, “The degree of corruption, not just the fact of it, is key to an understanding of contemporary Yemen. Graft, bribery and other forms of thievery pervade the system at all levels of a steeply sided pyramid of patronage.” The state does not function for the public good but in the best interests of a small elite grouping.

To legitimize and empower competing groups, ideologies or methods would diminish the volume of cash flowing from governmental corruption and criminal activities. An informed Yemeni public would probably do the very thing that democratic people are supposed to do, hold their leaders accountable. Internet censorship allows the regime to hide the truth about Yemen from the Yemeni people and the world at large. In Yemen, as elsewhere, the companion of censorship is propaganda.

Internet censorship also works in favor of the regime by thwarting the development of a national identity. A free national media, by airing viewpoints and grievances, fosters cross cutting sympathies among social groups separated by distance, heritage or other affiliation. The regime, for which national unity is a red line, encourages the fragmentation of the Yemeni people by isolating them from each other, deploying internet censorship, propaganda and takfirism to achieve disunity.

Internet censorship also isolates the Yemeni people from the international community. It thwarts the transfer of information from Yemen to the world and from the world into Yemen. As a result the Yemeni economy suffers. The technological barrier between Yemen and the world is reminiscent of Yemen’s isolationism under the Imamate. Technological censorship is reinforced by the omnipresence of secret police in the internet cafes.

Social pressures denied the venue of civil expression have the tendency to explode and such an outcome is possible in Yemen where citizens are largely excluded from the political system. With internet censorship, they are denied their public voice. Traditional democratic processes yield little progress in altering the centralization of power. The 2006 elections in Yemen were unfair despite some improvement over prior years. Even peaceful protests are judicially and violently thwarted. Southern protesters have repeatedly encountered brutality by security forces, and 17 protesters have been killed since August. Hundreds have been wounded and arrested.

The Yemeni government has little domestic credibility. Public trust in government may be at an all time low. Internet censorship is one more source of increasing public frustration. To maintain stability, the Yemeni regime must cede power to the people, as is its stated goal. Tangible action is overdue, not another back room deal or bit of well orchestrated propaganda. One suggestion is opening the voter rolls to scrutiny and authentication.

Yemen’s donors must realize that Yemen’s economic development, counter-terror cooperation and governmental efficiency all hinge on the growth of Yemeni civil rights. Pluralism, the equal rights of each citizen before the law, is the key to averting the looming disaster in Yemen. Lastly, the Yemeni people must recognize their united power. Civil rights are never given, bestowed or awarded; rights are always taken. Many in Yemen have paid the price for freedom although Yemen is not yet free; these sacrifices cannot be in vain.

(Y43) Yemen’s Intifada World Press

Yemen’s Intifada
Jane Novak, Worldpress.org contributing editor, January 2, 2008

Yemen is facing instability unseen since its 1994 civil war. A war with Shiite rebels in the northern Saada province left over 50,000 internal refugees. The rebellion ended in June but threatens to reignite as neither side has fully implemented the cease-fire conditions. The political and economic marginalization of vast segments of society contributed to the rebellion as did endemic governmental corruption, lack of basic services, and draconian security measures. These factors are also the catalyst for widespread protests in southern Yemen, some of which attracted over 100,000 protesters. Ten protesters were killed, allegedly by security forces, and many were beaten and arrested.

Hegemony Not Integration

Unrest in southern Yemen has its roots in northern hegemony following the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen. The Yemeni Socialist Party, which formerly ruled the south, was marginalized following Yemen’s 1994 civil war. Dr. Aidroos Naser al-Naqeeb, head of the Y.S.P.’s parliamentary block, said, “The Y.S.P. Central Committee indicated that the South was treated as the spoils of war including land, people, companies, and wealth. The Y.S.P. also noted the violence against the current protesters reflects the type of politics which has dominated after the outcome of the war.”

Post-war reconciliation between North and South was thwarted by the corruption among the northern oligarchy and by the installation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s relatives in many top military and security posts. Successive constitutional amendments centralized power in the executive, leading to a de facto merger between the ruling party and the state, both headed by Saleh.

Since May, protests have spread across Aden, Dhalie, Lahj, Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramout, organized by former southern military officers. They claim they were punitively discharged following the civil war at stipends well below sustenance level. Southern civil and military pensioners number over 100,000. Broader southern grievances include the appropriation and theft of commercial, residential, and public land by powerful northerners. State employment is an area of perceived systematic discrimination. Ubiquitous military camps and checkpoints are another sore spot.

Broad Discontent Finds Its Voice

Civil unrest in the South triggered a national outpouring of discontent. Thousands of protesters in Taiz held aloft water bottles and bread. In the oil producing Marib governorate, demonstrators demanded a share of oil revenue, jobs, and development funding. In Amran, north of the capital, 10,000 tribesmen demanded governmental reform. Teachers, students, doctors, pharmacists, trade unions, unemployed youth, journalists, and kidney patients have held individual and sometimes joint protests in the capital, Sanaa.

One common complaint among the various interest groups is rising prices. Inflation in the poverty-stricken nation was over 20 percent in 2006. Hoarding by the domestic wheat monopoly exacerbated international price increases on wheat in 2007, and higher priced loaves of bread shrank in size. Cooking gas cylinders increased in price from 400 Yemeni rials to 1,000 Yemeni rials.

Discontent also stems from the failure to implement in full the 2005 Wages Strategy, intended to buffer a reduction in oil subsidies. The reform dose was to be accompanied by corruption control and a reduction in governmental spending. However, a 278-billion-Yemeni-rial supplemental 2007 budget appropriation was pegged to the costs of the northern rebellion, continued oil subsidies, and the extra month salary promised to government workers during Saleh’s presidential campaign. The regime reinstated the draft to counter unemployment, although many citizens complain of being excluded from military service by domicile. Few top officials were prosecuted for misconduct although corruption takes 23 percent of the national budget.

Predictable Response

Despite the demands for relief and reform, Saleh’s regime is responding with the same tactics that spurred the unrest. Riot police fired live rounds and deployed tear gas and water cannons against protesters. Dozens of oppositionists were arrested including the Y.S.P.’s Hassan Ba-oom and the head of the military pensioners association, Gen. Nasser Al-Nawbah. Both were charged with treason and faced the death penalty, launching another round of protests. The pair was later released; however, 20 other political leaders were arrested. Hundreds remain in prison following the Saada War, including children.

The nongovernmental media is under assault. Journalist Abdulkarim al-Khaiwani faces the death penalty for publishing war news that “demoralized the military.” Security forces prevented Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya reporters from covering the southern protests. The Y.S.P.’s news Web site was blocked. Conversely, the regime uses the broadcast media to stir public sentiment, airing an Eid al-Fitr sermon that declared the protesting retirees no longer Muslims.

President Saleh is also attempting to manage public sentiment by promising reform and restitution; however, public trust is extremely low. Eight thousand southern officers were reinstated. Col. Naser Saleh Abdul Qawi reported that one condition of reinstatement was a pledge to foreswear peaceful political activity. Saleh proposed constitutional amendments to enhance local rule, but a recent electoral “reform” stacked the electoral commission in favor of the president’s omnipotent ruling party. In a Ramadan speech, Saleh downplayed the “fabricated crisis.” However, presidential advisor and former Prime Minister Abdel Bajammal threatened to revoke a weapons ban and rearm the northern citizenry to face the southern protesters.

Despite regional polarization, northern monopolization of military assets makes civil war unlikely. If oil production drops sharply, as predicted, nationwide discontent will increase. However, a disorganized, splintered citizenry decreases the risk of revolution. Yemen’s opposition parties have yet to establish an internal process of representation. Yemen’s 2009 parliamentary elections may unify the citizenry in rejection if the process is as unfair as the last presidential election. If instability increases, military commanders may move to protect their interests through a coup.

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Global Politician

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW: Yemeni MP Ahmed Said Hashed - “There Are No Human Rights In Yemen”

Mr. Ahmed Saif Hashed serves on the Yemeni Parliament’s Freedom and Human Rights Committee. An independent MP, Mr. Hashed represents constituency 70, which includes parts of Lahj and Taiz. Mr. Hashed is a prominent human rights activist with a special interest in the condition of Yemeni prisoners. He heads the Al-Tageer human rights organization and owns the Al-Mostakela newspaper. Jane Novak interviewed him for the Global Politician.

Q: Mr. Hashid, thank you for granting this interview. Can you tell us generally about the condition of human rights in Yemen? Which areas in your opinion require urgent attention?

ASH: Human rights in Yemen are totally absent. Crimes are committed by those responsible for protecting the law and its application. It pains me to find the security apparatuses practice torture, attacks and the worst kinds of mistreatments in the prisons and custody centers and also outside them.

This happens under the weak judiciary and the decorative parliament that was produced by terrible corruption and hasn’t even the minimum degree of responsibility. This country supports the tribe with its ignorant traditions at the expense of the law. It stands against law, and uses its force over the victims and over the legal articles that protect the human rights.

Q: You have been very active in advocating for the humane treatment of prisoners. What are the conditions like for prisoners in Yemeni central prisons in terms of food, sanitary conditions, medical care and abuse?

AHS: The food served to the prisoners is unpalatable and prepared in unhygienic conditions. The Parliamentary Committee of Rights and Freedom recommended increasing food allocations two years ago. Unfortunately the parliament has decreased the allocation. The most painful tragedy is that hundreds of prisoners do not receive any food allocations at all. For instance, the Sana’a Migrations and Passports Jail and some jails in Al- Houdadah depend on charity and soldiers’ food remains.

Some jails don’t have any infirmaries. Some others do, but they are in urgent need of medicine and equipment. Prisoners must purchase their prescriptions from the market; otherwise, they die in the jail.

Skin diseases are also common in some jails and are not treated. Some women are found to be suffering from diseases including syphilis and other skin diseases considered so disgusting that they are rejected by hospitals and are not kept in separation as a preventive measure.

The sanitary conditions in the prisons and custody centers are miserable. Heaps of urine bottles and defecation plastic bags were noticed at the corners of some prisons. The military police prison in Sana’a is one example. Other prisons, which are ancient and dirty buildings, do not have any good ventilation. This situation becomes worse during hot weather and when moisture increases. In some prisons, they use waste water due to the absence of drinkable water.

The prisons in Yemen are over crowded with the number of prisoners exceeding three times the capacity. It is unbelievable to find districts in Al-Houdeida governorate with no jails for women. In Alzaidia, female defendants are put in a house belonging to an old man. I visited this house and found five female defendants aged between ten and fifteen, accused of adultery, who have neither food nor health care allocations, but rather depend on charity .

Q: Is there a central authority that overseas all prisons? What kind of prisons exists in Yemen and how are they organized?

ASH: The central prisons and the custody centers in the governorates belong to the general prisons authority in Sana’a. The authority of prisons stems from Ministry of Interior. However, the security administrations exert greater influence on those prisons. Others prisons, holding hundreds, are controlled by their respective governmental security administrations and are not included into prisons department system. As a result, these prisons receive no official food and other allocations. Concerning the political security prisons, they are big, private and frightful, and it is impossible for anyone to visit them, even if parliament members.

Q: Can you explain the difference between tribal prisons, private prisons and central prisons?

ASH. Most of the sheiks in Yemen have their private prisons. These prisons are illegal. Among these illegal private prisons are the political security prisons in which there are horrible criminal acts against human dignity and rights. They are prisons in which you may spend years without justice. Then you may be released without charge or arbiter or even excuse. In its basements are horrible criminal acts and human indignities in such a manner that is unbelievable. It is a pity that the judiciary can not control such places.

Q: The Children’s Parliament visited children in detention found them in miserable conditions, beaten, malnourished, sexually exploited, held without trial and held for minor crimes. A study by the Interior Ministry concluded that 77% of juveniles (15 and under) in jail had not been charged. Another report documented over 500 juveniles in adult jails. How young are the youngest children in jail? If Yemeni law prohibits imprisoning children without charge, why are so many in jails?

ASH: Sorrowfully, many acts and crimes are committed against children in Yemen. For example, in Al-Maflahi prison in Lahj, a fifteen-tear-old child was sexually abused by a police officer. The incident was proved by three forensic experts. In the Ibb Jail of Investigation, a female child, no older than 13, was tortured by the investigators. In Al Baida Security Prison, child hostages, one of them aged below 11, were also found.

In Al-Houdaida Central Prison, a lot of children were found arrested by the political security. Some of them do not exceed 12. They live with the adults in the same prison and are prevented from being visited, by the orders of the Political Security orders. Those children are free of any charges. In fact, they are innocent. Some of them are taken from their schools. Others were arrested at roads while going or coming back from schools some were also captured at their houses. In one case, Ali Yaslam Ahmed, aged 14, was imprisoned for seven months. The security forces say that the child was arrested in place of his older brother, who had been sentenced to 10 years in jail.

A 16 year old hostage recounted his tale of being imprisoned four months ago, “My father is an old and sick man. He was taken as a hostage to bring his son under the pretext that he guaranteed but this was not proved. I am here in his place based on an order by Sheik Hamoud, the governorate security director”

Q: Are there many adults in prison who have never been charged as well?

ASH: This is very common in Yemen. Through our field visits ¸we find many prisoners without charges, dozens of hostages in who have been there for months and some of them for years without any acts ascribed to them. Rather they were jailed on the basis of crimes committed by their relatives or tribal members. Some of these prisoners have been for more than a year without any charge except their (religious) affiliation to the (Shiite) Hashemite House. This arrest is sometimes attributed to what they called precautionary action, which may last for one year or even more.

Q: Many (Shiite) Zaidis have been imprisoned since the outbreak of the Sa’ada war in 2004. Can you tell us how many were imprisoned in total and how many remain in jail?

ASH: There no clear statistics on the number of the arrests on the grounds of Sa’ada War. The government once confessed existence of three thousands. Yet, the number is much more than this, we think. Many prisoners were arrested on the grounds of the Sa’ada War without charge.

Q: Are there many political prisoners?

ASH: Yes, there political prisoners. For instance, Nasser Al-Nawba, the chairman of the retired associations coordination counsel, Hassan Ba Awm, a member of the political office of the Yemen Socialist Party. Hundreds of the arrests of the southern governorates were jailed and released on grounds of peaceful sit-ins in southern and some northern governorates during recent past.

Q: Many cases of brutal torture have reported in the media. One such case is that of Shaif Al-Haimi who says he was tortured by the National Security Agency, chained, severely beaten and scalded with boiling water. For 16 days, he was hung from the ceiling. Investigators forced him to dance. Prisoners in Hajja jail said they were tortured by policemen in charge of the jail and affiliated with the Criminal Investigation Bureau. How prevalent is torture in Yemeni jails?

ASH: Not only torture and methods of forcibly extraction of confession are common in private political security apparatuses prisons, but also prevalent in murder investigation departments and the Ministry of Interior’s police station. When I visited the murder investigation prison, as a member of the Parliament Freedom and Human Rights Committee, I saw, with my eyes, scars of stick beatings and heavy boots kicks, which are still apparent on the bodies of two persons. A report was made on this incident; however, the counsel of parliament did little. The murder investigation director is still in his position without being questioned by any official authority.

I also noticed other prisoners in police stations who were subject to torture and beatings. Among the victims is Abdulqader Mohammed, a Somali national, who has been in Yemen for six years. He was subjected to heavy beating a few months ago by five of the members of the Sana’a based Al-Wahda police station. Remains of this attack were proved by forensic examiners report.

Such acts happen daily in many police stations while Ministry of Interior does not stop or even reduce them, which indicate its partnership. It also does not consider them and send the criminals to the concerned authorities.

During one last visit to Al-Hodeida central prison on May 2005, we found out that many children, adults and disabled were complaining of torture, violence and isolated imprisonment by political security. These persons are jailed just on the grounds of Sa’ada War.

In Rada’a central prison, I noticed scars over the body of Mohammed Saleh, who demanded a forensic expert to testify them. He complained that they are remains of torture by acid and electricity. I took photos of these scars, recommending an investigation by the court of law. Others complained about being tortured with live cigarettes by the security.

Some prisoners complained about other means of torture, including hanging by hands or legs, beating by wires or cables, making hungry or thirsty, forcible long standing, prevention from sleeping for more than two days, psychological torturing, using acid and boiling water, pincers and others.

Q: Are you able to visit jails under the control of the Political Security Organization? What kind of prisoners are there?

ASH: No, we are not allowed to visit such jails. Since establishment of the parliament, its committee of rights and freedom did not pay even a single visit. An unsuccessful attempt made by the committee to visit the Political Security Prison in Hadramout. I personally tried to visit some political security jails, but was not allowed.

In example, Mohammed Ali Muhsen, from Aden, has been in the basements of the political security for one year and a half, on the basis of a letter he wrote to the president of the Republic, mentioning the bad situations and corruption in the political security system. He was arrested in Aden and sent to Sana’a political basements. The political security has been rejecting orders of the general director to release or even prosecute him, which, as usual, indicates superiority of the political security.

Q: The Ministry of Human Rights issued a report disclosing 100 hostages in five Yemeni prisons. What are hostages and how long are they held? Is this practice decreasing?

AHS: The number of hostages exceeds this figure greatly. While this figure was being stated by the Minister of human rights, I was visiting department of jails and found in official statistics dated 28 May 2007 that the number of hostages in Yemen reaches 545.

I have already visited AL-Baidah governorate, and found more than 70 hostages. The worst is that they include children. In the governorate security quarter prison, we found Abdurrahman Nasser Ahmed Ismail, below 10, Hussein Nasser Ahmed, aged 13. They are sons of the defendant Nasser Ahmed, whom the police could not arrest. Among them was the hostage Abdu-Alsalam Ali Ahmed, aged 15. He is a nephew of Nasser and a brother of the hostage, Abdraboo Ahmed Mohammed at the same time. In fact, they were released upon our visit.

We found Khalid Ahmed Abdu Hashem below 15, in Rada’a prison. While he was coming to bring bed-needs to his imprisoned uncle, Khaid was arrested by security guards and spent more than four months among killers and thieves. These hostages are mostly either some relative of escaped defendants or from their tribal members. In fact, crime involves only one, according to abiding law, and no one should be punished or jailed except on the basis of law. Sorrowfully we have never witnessed any positive and effective actions to reduce such a phenomenon.

Q: On June 26, 2006, Mr. Hashed you visited the Authority of Passports and Migration in Sana’a to conduct a field visit to the prison there. You intended to assess the condition of prisoners there after an Eritrean prisoner died under ambiguous circumstances. You report being beaten and kicked by prison officials, arbitrarily detained and threatened with death. Mr. Hashed, why were you treated this way?

ASH: This happened so that their crimes won’t be discovered by the public. Consequently, all the camera contents which I had were destroyed. These contents comprised a lot of photographs that unveiled the extent to which this authority is ugly. If a legal activist pays a sudden visit to these jails, this will scandalize the political system which pretends democracy and protection of rights and freedom. So, my attack could be a deterrent to any legal activist who may consider a sudden visit to these places.

Q: I understand that Parliament refused to hear some evidence about this incident. Why do you think they refused the evidence and where does the case stand now?

ASH: This issue was referred to the committee of defense and security, which is heavily biased towards the security apparatuses. The issue was initially rejected. This committee is the same one which had been entrusted to investigate the murder of my driver who was a relative of mine, Adel Saleh. It is the same committee entrusted with investigating my arrest at the political security apparatus headquarters after I participated in a peaceful sit-in, protesting against Ali Al-Dailami’s arrest by the political security. Al-Dailami was a legal activist and a chairman of the Yemen Association of defending rights and freedom. Instead of conducting investigation, the committee forced me to accept a tribal solution about my driver’s assassination and refused to investigate the second issue, my arrest, and it did nothing.

The committee intended to get rid of the issue of my attack at the passports and migration prison. It did not investigate. In fact, my intention was to direct them to question the prisoners who witnessed the crime. The committee refused to suspend the jail keeper during the investigation. It shamefully changed the facts, refused to investigate prisoners situations and was biased in all the proceedings, which is revealed by the report it has made. Instead of discussing these facts, and my explanation of the report of the committee, the parliament authorized another committee to solve my problems with the security committee which was formed for investigation.

It is in such a manner that the issue of prisoners’ situations was neglected, which was the stimulant of my visit to prisons, resulting in the negligence of the attack I was subject to. It is in such a way that many issues of human rights discussed at the parliament are tackled. This is an aspect of a tragedy we experience and pay its cost every day.

Q. What are the other situations of these prisoners? How do the concerned Authorities treat them, what are the most repeated complaints?

ASH: Most prisoners complain that judicial apparatuses do not abide by law, mainly concerning the dates fixed for imprisonment. Some prisoners complain of being imprisoned without trial or investigation, and of negligence in implementing the decrees ordering release of prisoners after ending period of punishment.

Judicial and prosecution members complain of procrastination. They ascribe some of the above-mentioned defects to the fact that the number judgment cadres is limited; the judge appointed may be responsible for more than six or seven districts or his districts may be over-populated. This occurs at the expense of the prisoner’s freedom.

Other issues include prisoners mixing with each other, children and adults. They are not separated on the basis of age, kind of crime, or stage of proceedings. Others have completed their period of punishment and are still imprisoned because of their inability to pay the costs, even if these costs are minimal. They may stay for a long time wanting for their legal decrees to be issued. Others say they don’t know the contents of these decrees because they don’t receive copies of the original. Some of them say they are prevented by the judge from defending themselves, mistreated during investigation and before they are sent to the public prosecution.

As for the foreigners who are arrested due to their illegal entrance to the country, they spend long periods in Yemen prison, waiting for years being freed; this subject motivated us to make a special page on “AL-Mostakela” to tackle problems of refuges in Yemen.

Jane Novak (jane.novak@gmail.com) reports on Yemen for the Global Politician.

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Weekly Standard

Yemen’s Truce with al Qaeda
Who will be the next victims? by Jane Novak
10/31/2007 12:00:00 AM

THE AMERICAN ATTEMPTS to rehabilitate the Yemeni regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh have not succeeded. Yemeni authorities recently pardoned Jamal Al-Badawi, convicted mastermind of the 2000 USS Cole bombing. All the terrorists who bombed the American warship and killed 17 American sailors are free, except those dead or in U.S. custody.

Jamal Al-Badawi was originally sentenced to death in 2004 as the lead planner of the USS Cole bombing. The sentence was reduced to 15 years. He escaped twice, the last time in February 2006. He has been on the loose since. He spent less than three years physically inside a jail, where, by the way, he was very well treated. One of the FBI’s top ten most wanted terrorists; he is currently at home receiving well wishers.

Yemeni President Saleh says openly that he has a truce with al Qaeda. However, it’s more than a truce; it’s a mutual support pact. That pact is long standing, mutually beneficial, and responsible for much of the carnage around the world, including the deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

The first al Qaeda attack was a 1992 hotel bombing in Aden, Yemen. The bombing targeted US troops heading for Somalia. The Yemeni regime’s relationship with al Qaeda was already well established by that point.

Presidential half brother General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar recruited fighters for bin Laden in the 1980’s and set up training camps in Yemen. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the Yemeni regime welcomed thousands of both Yemeni and non-Yemeni “Afghan Arabs” back to Yemen.

Yemeni President Saleh uses these al Qaeda operatives as a domestic paramilitary. The Afghan Arabs fought for Saleh in Yemen’s 1994 civil war. The war was framed as a jihad against Southern socialist “infidels.” Some of these bin Laden loyalists who fought for Saleh in 1994 are now high ranking members of the Yemeni military and security forces, governors, ambassadors and other appointed officials. Consequently, covert administrative support for al Qaeda is substantial in total, varied in nature, and appears on multiple levels.

Through the 1990’s, Osama bin Laden and Aiman Zawaheri regularly visited Yemen, meeting religious leaders and other prominent persons. Bin Laden delivered sermons in Yemeni mosques and purportedly held a six hour meeting with al-Ahmar in Sana’a airport in 1996.

In 1999, bin Laden bargained for the release of al Qaeda operative Tawfiq (Khallad) bin Attash who was arrested in Yemen. The Yemeni regime released Attash and promised not to confront al Qaeda. In exchange, bin Laden pledged not to attack Yemen. These terms mirror the current agreement which led to the release of al-Badawi. American aid, pressure, military training, and other coaxing have done little to alter the fundamental relationship between Saleh and al Qaeda.

In January of 2000, Attash, along with Yemeni Fahd al-Quso, attended a high level al Qaeda meeting in Malaysia at which the attacks on the USS Cole and the World Trade Center were discussed and planned. Both were later found guilty of organizing the Cole attack.

Al Qaeda operatives participated in the Sa’ada wars (2004-2007) when the state fought a Shiite rebel group in northern Yemen. Terrorists trained and indoctrinated Salafi tribesmen using the state’s military camps. The military determined the prolonged bombing of Shiite cities was necessary, as was the withholding of food, medicine and cooking oil to the entire region. Historic Shiite mosques were “accidentally” shelled. General al-Ahmar led the military assault.

What does al Qaeda gain? First of all, releases of operatives. Yemen’s revolving door for terrorists is accomplished by biased show trials, repetitive escapes, “rehabilitation,” and direct negotiation. The level of duplicity is astounding. For example, convicted Limburg bomber Abu Bakr al-Raibi was never actually in jail despite a ten year sentence. He was transported from his house to court in prison clothes, his father said. And apparently the United States fell for it.

Twenty-three al Qaeda operatives escaped from a high security Yemeni jail in February 2006, using a spoon to break through a concrete floor. Those who later surrendered received a pardon for a pledge. The pardoned include Abdullah al-Raimi, mastermind of the Riyadh bombings in 2003. Other al Qaeda operatives served limited jail time, like al Qaeda number two, Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal, who was never charged in the Cole bombing. Instead, al-Ahdal was convicted of handling substantial funds for al Qaeda, sentenced to three years time served and released.

The export of Yemeni al Qaeda operatives is another benefit for bin Laden. Yemeni terrorists are found in nearly every jihad: Lebanon, Chechnya, Somalia, and Iraq. A Yemeni newspaper documented 1,861 individual Yemenis who traveled to Iraq to engage in Jihad. The Islamic Courts Union’s jihad against Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government drew hundreds of Yemeni jihadists as well.

Jihadists are made, not born. The process that transforms a nice Yemeni boy into a suicide bomber shredded in the street is aided by “influential people.” State resources are present from indoctrination, to training, to documentation, to transport. Yemen’s near complete failure to thwart terror financing comes as no surprise. Neither does the release of al-Badawi, who presents a clear danger to the American homeland.

The threat to the United States posed by the reconstituted Cole bombing cell is high. The group has support from the tribal regions, access to state resources, operational experience, international connections, and ideological motivation. The risk is enhanced by the lack of a counter-terrorism environment in Yemen; the state is actively appeasing them. And considering they already blew up an American warship, target selection would tend toward the spectacular if they became operational.

However, the most immediate target of these al Qaeda operatives is likely Southern demonstrators. The regions of the former South Yemen have experienced widespread civil unrest since May. The growing protests threaten to fracture Yemen, thereby disrupting President Saleh’s cash flow from a variety of illegal enterprises. If the quid pro quo holds, these poor souls on the streets of Aden holding signs demanding democracy and justice will be the next victims of Saleh’s truce with al Qaeda. A fatwa was issued several weeks ago.

Jane Novak is a political analyst and expert on Yemeni affairs. She maintains the website armiesofliberation.com.

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Arab American News

Bloody protests worsen in YemenBy Jane Novak
Saturday, 10.27.2007, 01:36am

Since May, Yemen has witnessed widespread civil unrest in the southern governorates, including Aden and Marib. Three protesters were killed during demonstrations in Mukallah, and two more were killed in Dhalie. On October 13, five people were shot dead at a sit-in in Radfan, Lahj when security forces opened fire on the crowd. Witnesses reported a dozen wounded. Over fifty thousand people gathered the next day in Radfan for a previously scheduled demonstration despite these brutal security practices.

Several Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) leaders were charged with liability for the Radfan deaths because they organized the demonstration. No one in the security forces has been held responsible for any of the protesters’ deaths or beatings. Another large demonstration is scheduled for November, and the situation remains tense.

“We want equal rights,” retired Brigadier General Ali Moqbel told The Arab American News. General Moqbel leads the Retired Military Consultation Association (MCRA). After the 1994 civil war between the YSP and President Saleh’s northern forces, over one hundred thousand southerners were forcibly retired on below sustenance pensions. This disenfranchised group, known as “the stay-at-home party,” has taken to the streets.

“The goal of the MCRA,” Muqbel said, “is to return all southerners to their previous employment in the same positions, both civilians and soldiers, who were referred to retirement after the war in 1994.”

The current instability is rooted in the past. The 1990 unity of North and South Yemen brought northern hegemony, leading to civil war in 1994. Afterward, the unified country’s democratic and pluralistic foundations were undermined by successive constitutional amendments that centralized power in the executive. The YSP, which had ruled South Yemen, was marginalized.

Post war reconciliation was stymied by practices of the northern elite that economically subjugated the south. Dr. Abdullah Al-Faqih, Political Science Professor at Sana’a University explained, “The economic system became something resembling a colonial economy where the purchasing power and the economic benefits follow one direction—from the south to the north.”

Professor Bob Burrowes of the University of Washington invented the word “kleptocracy” to describe Yemen. He defines it as “government by and for thieves.” Corruption and nepotism assured Yemeni President Saleh’s post civil war domination, a Yemeni editor explained to The Arab American News, “To preserve the loyalty of tribal leaders and senior military commanders, Saleh kept on ignoring many of their ill practices. Saleh has been busy pleasing his cronies with the country’s wealth and senior positions just to remain in power for as long as possible.”

Dr. Aidroos Nasr Naser Al-Naqeeb, who heads the YSP block in parliament noted, “The YSP Central Committee indicated that the South was treated as the spoils of war including land, people, companies and wealth. The current violence against the protesters reflects the type of politics which has dominated after the outcome of the war.”

A high ranking official of President Saleh’s ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), disputed that influential northerners stole southern lands, calling it “a lie.” Dr. Aidroos countered, “Land theft is an undeniable fact. The land stolen includes agricultural lands, land of the former government in the south, lands of corporations and wide areas suitable for building and investment trading. This occurred in all southern governorates.”

Dr. Aidroos has little confidence in a governmental committee recently established to solve land issues. “While I don’t doubt the committee’s fairness or their desire to do some things better, there are influential people stronger than all these committees,” he said. “They are big military leaders and officials in the ruling party that have substantial authority and the power to destroy any person that damages their benefits.”

However, Dr. Aidroos pointed out, “There is a long line (of people) in the GPC that have a strong desire to institute many reforms in Yemen. Their inability to speak bluntly or even to hint comes from the fear of the consequences or official procedures. These consequences occur against anyone with an outspoken position that crosses the “red lines” established by powerful people. GPC members in parliament claim they have orders from high up which are against their own inclination and which obstruct the work of parliament to do any reforms.”

In addition to forming the land committee, the government has tried to mitigate growing civil unrest by reinstating seven thousand former military officers. President Saleh also proposed several constitutional amendments including a quota system for women, the empowerment of local councils with tax and expenditure authority, and broadening the number of officials selected by the electoral process. The plan designates a presidential system, contrary to the opposition’s proposal for a parliamentary system.

After years of broken promises, Saleh’s reform platform has been met with skepticism by some who call it another show for Western observers. For example, prior to the 2006 local elections President Saleh repeatedly promised that the GPC would institute a quota system for women . It didn’t happen. Consequently, women occupy less than one per cent of GPC seats on the local level. President Saleh has not appointed any women governors and only two as cabinet ministers. Saleh already has the authority to empower Yemeni women, and he doesn’t.

“The regime has no actual desire for any administrative, financial, political, or legal reforms,” Dr. Aidross finds. “The recent initiative of President Saleh in practice will further consolidate power in the central authority, and all the posts will be derived from presidential authority. The presidential initiative will hinder the emergence of democracy in Yemen.” Dr. Aidroos says that Saleh’s initiative is designed to “protect the status quo under the guise of the protection of national unity.”

In a typical Saleh sleight of hand, the plan establishes more elected positions, but the GPC has ruled out the more fundamental step of electoral reform. The commission overseeing future elections will be appointed by the president and his appointees, Saleh announced. In discussing Yemen’s presidential election in 2006, Dr Aidross describes Yemen’s voters as “terrorized and bribed” and the process as “subverted by extensive forgery.” The result does not reflect the will of the voters, he says.

In Yemen, half of all five year olds are physically stunted by chronic hunger and three quarters of women are illiterate. Yemen’s oil and water are depleting rapidly. Unemployment and inflation are high. Governmental corruption is rampant. Military spending is among the highest in the world and health spending among the lowest. The situation is so critical that Professor Al-Faqih believes, “Only profound reforms can save Yemen from descending into a total chaos similar to that experienced by Somalia and Lebanon before that.”

Some individual cabinet ministers have implemented significant measures to combat corruption and increase government efficiency. However the entrenched power of “influential people” limits the capacity of even the most earnest patriot.

The opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) sees “the need to transform to a parliamentary system.” Dr. Aidroos explained. “We as a country face civil unrest, economic stagnation and social difficulties. There is no remedy without increased parliamentary authority, the separation of authority between the executive branch and the parliament, and the ability of the parliament to act as a check on executive power.”

President Saleh has long used the courts, the government media and security forces to squelch dissent. Responding to the southern protests with bullets and propaganda may trigger a civil war if the public loses hope in gaining equality through peaceful means. In order to gain the public’s trust, Saleh needs to take action. A government interested in reform, modernization and pluralism does not kidnap, beat and imprison journalists. The release of Editor Abdulkarim Al-Khaiwani from jail with an apology would be a good first step for President Saleh in demonstrating his newly found sincerity.

The writer maintains www.armiesofliberation.com. Email jane.novak@gmail.com

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Global Politician

The Cole Bombing in Yemen: A Seven Year Perspective
Jane Novak - 10/12/2007

On October 12, 2000 two Yemeni suicide bombers rammed an explosives-laden dingy into an American destroyer, the USS Cole. Seventeen US service members were killed and forty-nine injured. The destroyer had been invited by the Yemeni government to refuel in the port of Aden.

In the light of historical perspective, several facts have become clear. Intelligence warnings generated prior to the attack were never forwarded to the commander of the Cole. The investigation afterwards was marred by turf wars within the US government, leaving links between the Cole bombing and the attacks of 9/11 unexplored. The Yemeni government worked diligently to limit the scope of the US investigation. Almost all the Yemenis involved in the Cole bombing are walking free. The involvement of some Yemeni officials in the bombing is documented; however, the scope of that involvement is not.

THE YEMEN SIDE

The 1990’s

Military commander and presidential half brother, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar recruited fighters for bin Laden in the 1980’s and set up training camps in Yemen. Thousands of Yemenis at all levels were active in the Afghan conflict. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the Yemeni regime welcomed thousands of both Yemeni and non-Yemeni “Afghan Arabs” back to Yemen. Many of these hard core Islamists were militarily deployed in defense of the regime during its civil war in 1994 against Southern Socialists. As a result, many Afghan Arabs and other Islamic militants who fought in 1994 against “apostate” socialists are today ensconced in high level government positions. Others were absorbed into the military and security forces.

Through the 1990’s, both Osama bin Laden and Aiman Zawaheri traveled in and out and around Yemen on many occasions, often meeting religious leaders and prominent persons. Bin Laden delivered sermons in Yemeni mosques and purportedly held a six hour meeting with Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in Sana’a airport in 1996.

Bin Laden made a deal with the Yemeni government in 1999, according to the 9/11 Commission Report. After A l-Qaeda operative Khallad bin Attash was arrested in Yemen, Bin Laden contacted a Yemeni official and bargained for Attash’s release. The Yemeni regime released Attash and promised not to confront al-Qaeda. In exchange, Bin Laden pledged not to attack Yemen. This pattern of negotiation continues today.

In 1999, Attash returned to Afghanistan. In January 2000 Attash along with Yemeni Fahd al-Quso attended a high level al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia at which the attacks on the USS Cole and the World Trade Center were discussed and planned. Attash, who was captured by US forces in Pakistan in 2003, confessed to organizing the Cole attack according to a military transcripts released at his hearing held at Guantanamo Bay. Al-Quso who helped prepared the bombing of the USS Cole was found guilty in a Yemeni court.

Were the Bombers Tipped Off?

In 2000, security concerns in Dijoubouti made Aden port only a slightly more attractive choice for refueling the Cole. Refueling at sea was also certainly an option. However, the US was concerned with rebuilding relations with Yemen. Relations had cooled significantly after the first Gulf War when Yemen, holding a Security Council seat, supported long time ally Saddam Hussein against the US.

One lingering question about the Cole bombing is whether the bombers had advance knowledge about the arrival of the USS Cole. Oddly, the Yemeni government denied receiving information about the impending arrival of the USS Cole. Yemeni President Saleh said, “The Americans made a mistake when they entered the port with such a large size and greatly valuable destroyer without guarding or notifying the Yemeni side to provide such protection,” the Yemen Times reported in November 2000. However, General Anthony Zinni, former Centcom commander, noted in his 2000 congressional testimony that, “The force protection in the port is the responsibility of the Yemeni government.” He noted that specific arrangements for the visit are, “done with the port authority, and the government of Yemeni officials; their security forces.” He also indicated that such notice is normally issued by the United States to a foreign government about two weeks prior to the arrival of a US vessel.

Lawrence Wright in The Looming Tower notes, “The FBI was convinced that the bombers had been tipped off about the arrival of the Cole, and they wanted to expand the investigation to include a member of the president’s own family and a colonel in the PSO.” The Yemeni government denied these requests while blaming the US for bombing its own ship. In July 2001, a top Yemeni official told the Egyptian governmental weekly, Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, that the Yemeni investigation indicated that the US intentionally blew up the Cole as a pretext for invasion. He said the US planned on turning the port of Aden into a US naval base. In December 2005, President Saleh repeated these claims on national TV, stating, “there was a plan to occupy Aden” after the Cole bombing. However notorious the Yemeni regime may be for duplicity, and many within the US administration excuse these statements as understandable domestic posturing, the fact remains there are many indications of regime complicity in the bombing of the USS Cole.

As noted by a 2007 US Congressional Research Service report, ” Yemeni authorities did not fully cooperate in the investigation of the Cole bombing.” US investigators were prevented from directly interrogating Yemeni suspects, and were forced to submit their questions on paper. The Yemeni officials also hid evidence. According to Lawrence Wright, “The Yemenis finally produced a videotape taken by a harborside security camera, but it appeared to have been edited to delete the crucial moment of explosionâ€¦” T he Yemeni government’s lack of cooperation with federal investigators was most like designed to protect upper level officials complicit in the attack.

One document admitted by the Yemeni court in the 2003 trial of five accused Cole plotters was an official letter from Yemen’s then interior minister, Hussain Arab, which instructed Yemeni security forces to give safe passage and cooperation to Muhammed Omar al-Harazi a/k/a Abd al-Rahman Al-Nashiri from April to December 2000. Other documents used by the bombers included arms permits normally issued by the Ministry of the Interior which were said to be a forgery, the Yemen Times reported in 2005.

The Yemeni Opposition Group, the Southern Democratic Assembly based in the UK, issued a statement in November 2006 prior to a London Donors Conference on Yemen which reads in part, ” Both the evidence and information indicate that who carried out the bombing attack on the American Warship USS Cole in Aden port in October 2000 are well-known bodies to the Yemeni regime and some of who were involved still in their jobs.”

In May 2001, UPI reported, “According to several US government sources, one of the reasons the attack on the Cole succeeded was involvement by the ‘highest levels’ of the Yemen government of President Ali Abdallah Saleh, although Saleh himself personally was not.” However this is not a view shared by the former commander of the Yemeni Navy at the time of the Cole bombing. In an interview after he defected to the UK, Commander Ahmed Al-Hassani said that President Saleh knew in advance of the bombing. Al-Hassani pointed out that the night before the bombing, President Saleh sent his Interior Minister and Political Security Minister from the capital Sana’a to Aden where the USS Cole was bombed hours later.

The Cole Bombers

The Yemeni justice system is highly corrupt, politicized and irregular. Thus it is unsurprising that with few exceptions, the Cole plotters and their co-conspirators were given light sentences, were released early, were never charged or escaped jail multiple times. Some convicted terrorists were later given government jobs, money, land and a car in order to facilitate their reintegration into society, the Yemeni government says. The regime defends these actions as a practical way to diminish the threat of future terror attacks. Others see these accommodations as a reward.

The Yemeni government named Jamal Muhammad al-Badawi as the leader of the group, Abdu al-Rahim al-Nashiri as the financier and several others as involved, including two policemen who provided false documents. However shortly after, Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal was listed as one of the main operatives and financiers of the plot.

Six convicted Cole conspirators’ appeal verdict was rendered in March of 2005 wherein the Yemeni court reduced Mamoon Amswah’s sentence from eight to five years. The court upheld the death penalty for Abdu al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who is in US custody. Fahd Al-Quso who helped prepare the bombing and was supposed to videotape the explosion had his ten year prison sentence upheld. Ali Mohamed Murakab and Morad al-Sorori both retained five year sentences for forging identification documents.

Jamal al-Badawi was originally sentenced to death by a Yemeni court for his involvement in the attack. The sentence was commuted upon appeal to fifteen years in prison. However, al-Badawi managed to escape from jail twice and is currently at large. Ten prisoners linked to the USS Cole bombing, including Jamal al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso, escaped from an Aden jail in 2003. Other 2003 Aden escapees included Khaldoun Al-Hukaimi and Saleh Mana. The pair was reported to have committed suicide attacks in Iraq in 2005, RayNews reported.

After their escape from prison, in May 2003 Jamal Al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso were indicted on over fifty terror related offenses by a federal grand jury in Manhattan, New York for plotting the attack on the Cole. Both al-Quso and al-Badawi were recaptured in March 2004. Jamal Al-Badawi escaped from prison again in 2006 along with 17 others involved in the USS Cole bombing. Shortly after the escape, Yemen’s Specialized Penal Court ordered the release of Hadi Saleh Al-Waeli suspected of selling arms, ammunition and explosives to the terrorists who bombed the USS Cole Destroyer at Aden Port in 2000.

In 2003, Yemen arrested Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal. On the US list of most wanted terrorists in Yemen. Al-Ahdal is believed to be one of the masterminds of the Cole bombing. Yemen refused to allow US federal investigators access to Al-Ahdal, insisting instead that the FBI submit questions for al-Ahdal in writing. Sources indicated to the Yemen Times that al-Ahdal had confessed to “being in charge of technical and financial preparations” for both the Cole and Limburg attacks. Al-Ahdal was tried and convicted in 2006 on charges of distributing money for al-Qaeda. No charges were brought relating to the Cole bombing. He was sentenced to 37 months in prison, and with time served, was released shortly thereafter. In 2006, Ghalib Al-Zaidi was also charged with harboring al-Ahdal for a month following the Cole bombing; al-Zaidi was sentenced to three years time served and released.

THE US SIDE

Turf Wars Hamper Investigation

The FBI’s ability to investigate the bombing was curtailed not only by the Yemeni government but also by the US State Department, which was interested in maintaining good relation with Yemen. Lead FBI investigator and one of the US’s foremost al-Qaeda experts, John O’Neill ” had come to believe that some Yemeni officials were not being forthcoming about information from (Fahd) al Quso and other suspects,” Frontline reported. However, the US ambassador to Yemen clashed with O’Neill, hampering the FBI’s investigations . Tensions between O’Neill and Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, escalated to the point where Bodine actively lobbied to have O’Neill taken off the case. According to Barry Mawn, O’Neill’s boss who was called in to investigated the dispute, “it was clear that she simply hated his guts.” Bodine was O’Neill’s only detractor, Mawn found. Bodine prohibited O’Neill’s re-entry into Yemen after he withdrew his team in response to a threat against his agents. According to Cooperative Research, “without (O’Neill’s) influential presence, the Yemeni government will not allow an interrogation.”

Similarly, the CIA failed to share intelligence with the FBI after the Cole bombing, and connections between the USS Cole bombing and 9/11 were left unexplored. The CIA did not forward information about Tawfiq bin-Attash (a/k/a Khallad) when requested by the FBI. The FBI had growing suspicions of a second attack when it was discovered that prior to the Cole bombing, money was taken out of Yemen by al-Quso and given to Attash. The CIA was aware of the 2000 Malaysia meeting among several high level al-Qaeda operatives, including calls between Malaysia and Yemen. The CIA had photos of both Attash and al-Quso at the Malysia meeting; however it withheld the photos and other information about the meeting from the FBI.

Warnings Before Not Circulated

The failure of the US embassy and the CIA to support the FBI’s investigation after the Cole bombing was preceded by a lack of US intelligence coordination before the bombing. Richard Clarke, the National Security Council adviser stated to CNN shortly after the bombing that there was “no basis” for saying that the USS Cole bombing was an intelligence failure on the part of the US intelligence community. However, a secret Pentagon intelligence unit known as Able Danger identified increased al-Qaeda activity in Aden prior to the Cole attack two weeks before the attack and again two days before the terrorist attack.

The New York Post reported that Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s former liaison to Able Danger said Capt. Scott Phillpott, Able Danger’s leader, briefed Gen. Peter Schoomaker, former head of Special Operations Command about the findings on Yemen “two or three weeks” before the Cole attack. ” Yemen was elevated by Able Danger to be one of the top three hot spots for al Qaeda in the entire world,” Shaffer said.

Congressman Kurt Weldon in a 2005 Congressional floor speech said, “They (Able Danger) also identified the threat to the USS Cole two weeks before the attack, and two days before the attack were screaming not to let the USS Cole come into the harbor at Yemen because they knew something was about to happen.” The Scramento Bee reported that “Two Able Danger analysts briefed Gen. Peter Schoomaker, then head of U.S. Special Operations Command, on their findingsâ€¦two days before the attack on the Cole.” The commander of the USS Cole, Kirk Lippold, never received the warning.

Another intelligence analyst, Kie Fallis, at the Defense Intelligence Agency also advised several of his superiors of the heightened risk in Yemen and indications of terror activities in Aden prior to the attack. An official warning was not generated. As Senator Pat Roberts noted during Congress’ Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks, “(Fallis) attempted in vain — in vain, to convince his superiors to issue a threat warning in August of 2000â€¦His warnings were considered — I think they were called anomalies, not connections. And we now know different. The NSA issued the warning the day after the attack.”

Tommy Franks, commander of Centcom at the time of the Cole bombing testified before Congress that he never received any warning regarding Aden, nor did he review the decision of his predecessor General Zinni to refuel at Aden port. Naval Commander Lippold has been blocked from promotion and, as a result of the US Navy’s “up or out policy”, is being forced into retirement. Able Danger’s Anthony Shaeffer had his security clearance was revoked in 2006 and his family’s health insurance cancelled, apparently in retribution for speaking out. Kie Fallis quit DIA in protest the day after the bombings.

Back to the future

The bombing of the USS Cole was one incident in a pattern of escalating al-Qaeda attacks on the US that began with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and culminated in 2001 with the deaths of nearly 3000 US citizens. In the wake of 9/11, structural procedures and adjustments have been instituted to break down the wall between US intelligence agencies. However, the tension caused by maintaining the semi-cooperation of “allies” in counter-terror efforts remains a vital issue, and no better example exists than US-Yemeni relations.

In 2007, international cooperation is essential in uncovering terrorists’ plans, networks and operatives. However, many find the US focus on counter-terror both myopic and counter-productive in dealing with its allies. This view is widely held by Yemeni reformers who pay the price for their advocacy in blood. The US is perceived as tacitly approving of civil and human rights abuses as long as the regime is forth coming with counter-terror cooperation. Yemen’s progressives have a message that undermines the dictatorship, regressive forces and the terrorists. Consequently, reformists are targeted by the regime and labeled un-Islamic and Western stooges in the public media.

Yemen uses and exports Islamic fanatics as a tool of domestic and foreign policy. After the empowerment of Hamas in a democratic election, the idealistic US push for democratization and reform in the Middle East was met by the real-politik fears of radical Islamists gaining political power. In Yemen, radical Islamists already have political power and government jobs, as evidenced by the state’s failure to thwart terrorist financing, media incitement, mosque incitement, material support and moral support for terrorism. With or without official political status, elections or recognition, Yemeni Islamist militants are capable of influencing the regime and deploying state resources. And these political players are more dangerous when they are playing the game underground, while an enormous game of charades takes place in the media.

The days of “with us or against us” are certainly over as the intertwined structure between dictatorships and terrorists becomes clearer. To undermine one is to undermine the other, to support one supports the other. The natural alliance between indigenous reformists and the United States is dysfunctional in the current climate, leaving both more vulnerable. However, there are many in the Yemeni administration and some in the opposition who are quite patriotic and in favor of reform and modernization. Somehow the US must become as good at playing both sides of the fence as the Yemeni regime is.

Jane Novak (jane.novak@gmail.com) reports on Yemen for the Global Politician.

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World Press

Disband Yemen’s Ruling Party

Jane Novak, Worldpress.org contributing editor, September 2, 2007

Since Yemen’s presidential election last September, the nation is experiencing several areas of instability. Crisis areas include the fourth recurrence of the Saada war in North Yemen, popular protests in the former South Yemen, hostile tribal posturing, and the resurgence of terror attacks directed at the state. One causal factor common to all these conflicts is institutionalized inequality or state discrimination. This inequality is also the foundation of massive corruption that is destroying Yemen. With elitism so engrained and corruption so pervasive structural reform is nearly impossible. One solution may be to dissolve the national mechanisms that function to perpetuate inequality and enable corruption, starting with Yemen’s ruling party.

Hopes generated before Yemen’s presidential election were dashed in its wake. Oppositionists were disappointed that the election was a pantomime of democracy with state resources overwhelmingly supporting President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the victor and incumbent of 28 years. Saleh’s supporters were disappointed when his expansive election platform produced few tangible results upon his reelection. In fact, the situation worsened for the average Yemeni with prices rocketing higher.

After the election, Yemen’s military fought an intense war with Shia rebels in Yemen’s northernmost Saada region. Estimates are the war cost over a billion dollars since January. Thousands of soldiers, rebels, and civilians have been killed and wounded. Cities and villages have been laid to waste. Internal refugees number over 50,000. The International Committee of the Red Cross has noted that food in the region is in critically short supply and the local population has been without medical facilities since the inception of the war. Yemen has fought the insurgents three times since 2004. Each time, mediation led to a ceasefire that was then broken by both sides.

Renewal of tensions between Yemen’s major northern tribal confederations was a predictable result of the tribalization of the Saada war. The military inducted thousands of President Saleh’s Hashid tribesmen, and reports of looting and indiscriminate violence emerged. Senior Bakil sheiks issued statements warning of the potential for the broadening of the conflict or years of localized retaliatory tribal warfare. The National Solidarity Council was announced in July and consists of 1,000 tribal sheiks and dignitaries primarily from the Hashid confederation. A hastily formed grouping of Bakil tribal leaders announced their opposition to the National Solidarity Council in August, accusing it of intending to foster conflicts and Libyan support.

With war tapering off in the north, long suppressed tensions have come to the surface in the south. Popular protests are expressing the grievances of tens of thousands of southern military officers who were punitively discharged after Yemen’s 1994 civil war. Despite the regime’s assurances of reconciliation, the southern officers remained unemployed and lived on below-sustenance pensions for over a decade. In August, Yemeni security forces banned “unauthorized” demonstrations in Aden after a series of increasingly large protest marches began in May. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested. Others were beaten on the street. One died. Regime efforts to quell the movement included promoting about 600 former officers, creating a clone of the pensioners’ organization, and promising to increase the pensions to legally required levels.

Each of these conflicts has its roots in intentional inequality. The 1990 unity between the former South Yemen and North Yemen was subverted by the dominance of the northern General People’s Congress (G.P.C.) party. In the south, state discrimination takes the form of massive land theft, targeted impoverishment, and the withholding of employment and educational opportunities. Geographic discrimination is not unusual. The withholding of water to Taiz is discrimination against a city. The politicized arrest of Al Shura editor Abdulkarim al-Khaiwani is discrimination against a person. The war in Saada, primarily a political one, gained sectarian overtones when security forces began to target Zaidis by identity. The mass arrest of Zaidi preachers, students, and villagers is state discrimination, as is the withholding of food and medicine to the region. The primacy of President Saleh’s Hashid tribe is derived from its association with the tools of the state. The access to economic benefits based on tribal affiliation as well as the immunity of the Hashid from the judiciary is institutionalized inequality. The inequality among groups (political, regional, tribal, sectarian) is reinforced by state media incitement.

In response to these recurring areas of instability and violence, the regime and the opposition parties are reacting predictably and in ways that initially fostered the conflicts. The government has responded with coercion, patronage, and propaganda without addressing any of the underlying factors such as political exclusion. The Houthis remain “monarchists” and the southerners “separatists” according to the official media. Movement leaders are plied with funds and accommodations while the bulk of Yeminis face brutal security forces and a well-armed military.

The Yemeni opposition blames and criticizes the G.P.C.; however, it is just as elitist. Some opposition leaders have also been co-opted by the G.P.C. and work toward the best interest of the ruling party, not the opposition or the people. The opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties (J.M.P.), hopes to wrest control away from the powerful ruling party in Yemen’s 2009 parliamentary elections. The J.M.P. operates in a limited political space with the threat of violence never far away. The constraints on the J.M.P. do not preclude it from operating democratically. However, the J.M.P.’s lack of commitment in practice to equality, transition of power, transparency, and free speech work to limit its credibility. For the J.M.P.’s promises to ring true, the coalition would need to demonstrate the ability to reform itself and engage in internal democratic practices.

Yemen is facing dramatic times that require new and dramatic solutions. One way to disentangle corrupt relationships and encourage a merit-based hierarchy is to dissolve the ruling party. The G.P.C. functions similarly to the Syrian Baath party and the former Iraqi Baath party, as a party of access, influence, and patronage. The party merged with state institutions and bureaucracies that have become politicized. The party operates in its own self-interest and has grown to dominate public space.

Dissolving the G.P.C. would enable space for authentic reform

Armies of Liberation

Jane Novak's blog about Yemen

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